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I. INTRODUCTION
Which president owed his election to the three-fifths rule? Over the
last quarter-century, a distinguished array of scholars have claimed that
Thomas Jefferson owed his first term in the Executive Mansion to the three-
fifths rule.1 They may well be mistaken. A much better argument can be
made that John Quincy Adams was the president who owed his election to
the three-fifths rule.2
In a 2013 article in the Rutgers Law Journal, Paul Finkelman detailed
the proslavery nature of the original Constitution.3 After listing five consti-
tutional clauses that directly sanctioned slavery,4 Finkelman noted that
the three-fifths clause also gave the South extra political mus-
cle—in the House of Representatives and in the electoral col-
1. WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, THE ROAD TO DISUNION, VOLUME 1, SECESSIONISTS AT BAY,
1776–1854, at 147, 559 (1990); JAMES ROGER SHARP, AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE EARLY REPUB-
LIC: THE NEW NATION IN CRISIS 247 (1993) [hereinafter SHARP, AMERICAN POLITICS] ; LEONARD
RICHARDS, THE SLAVE POWER 43 (2000); Brian D. Humes, Elaine K. Swift, Richard M. Valelly,
Kenneth Finegold & Evelyn C. Fink, Representation of the Antebellum South in the House of
Representatives: Measuring the Impact of the Three-Fifths Clause, in PARTY, PROCESS, AND PO-
LITICAL CHANGE IN CONGRESS: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE HISTORY OF CONGRESS 452, 464
(David. W. Brady & Mathew D. McCubbins eds., 2002); Jack N. Rakove, The Political Presi-
dency: Discovery and Invention, in THE REVOLUTION OF 1800: DEMOCRACY, RACE, AND THE NEW
REPUBLIC 30, 31 (James Horn, Jan Ellen Lewis & Peter S. Onuf eds., 2002); GARRY WILLS,
“NEGRO PRESIDENT”: JEFFERSON AND THE SLAVE POWER 2, 62, 234 n.2 (2003); SUSAN DUNN,
JEFFERSON’S SECOND REVOLUTION: THE ELECTION CRISIS OF 1800 AND THE TRIUMPH OF REPUBLI-
CANISM 192 (2004); JOHN FERLING, ADAMS VS. JEFFERSON: THE TUMULTUOUS ELECTION OF 1800,
at 168 (2004); BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MAR-
SHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 34 (2005); AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 345–46, 599 n.44 (Random House 2d ed. 2005); MARK A. GRABER,
DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 115 n.30 (2006); Robin L. Einhorn,
Institutional Reality in the Age of Slavery: Taxation and Democracy in the States, 18(1) J. POL’Y
HIST. 21, 41 n.21 (2006); SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 90 (2006); EDWARD
J. LARSON, A MAGNIFICENT CATASTROPHE: THE TUMULTUOUS ELECTION OF 1800, AMERICA’S
FIRST PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 250 (2007); JAMES ROGER SHARP, THE DEADLOCKED ELECTION
OF 1800: JEFFERSON, BURR, AND THE UNION IN THE BALANCE 173 (2010) [hereinafter SHARP,
DEADLOCKED ELECTION OF 1800]; Paul Finkelman, How the Proslavery Constitution Led to the
Civil War, 43 RUTGERS L.J. 405 (2013). Wills, Sharp, Richards, Dunn, Ackerman, and Amar cite
contemporary New England newspaper accounts of the election. Wills, Dunn, and Ferling cite
Freehling.
2. Humes et al., supra note 1, at 464. R
3. Finkelman, supra note 1, at 405. R
4. The “three-fifths clause,” the “slave trade clause,” the “capitation tax clause,” the “fugi-
tive slave clause,” and the provision in Article V prohibiting any amendment to the slave importa-
tion or capitation clauses prior to 1808. Id. at 418–19.
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lege—to support that claim. Indeed, the electoral college
provision might be seen as a sixth direct proslavery provision[.]5
He continued by asserting, “Thomas Jefferson’s victory in the election
of 1800 would be possible only because of the electoral votes the southern
states gained on account of their slaves.”6
In response, Earl Maltz disputed Finkelman’s claim “that the presiden-
tial selection process could be described as proslavery in any meaningful
sense.”7 Maltz also disputed Finkelman’s claim concerning Jefferson’s
election in 1800.8
Finkelman’s claim concerning the election of 1800 is not a new one.
Over the last quarter-century, Finkelman and distinguished scholars such as
William Freehling, James Roger Sharp, Leonard Richards, Brian D. Humes
et al., Jack Rakove, Garry Wills, Susan Dunn, John Ferling, Bruce Acker-
man, Akhil Reed Amar, Mark Graber, Robin Einhorn, Sanford Levinson,
and Edward J. Larson have each claimed that Thomas Jefferson owed his
first term in the Executive Mansion to the three-fifths rule.9 I do not deny
that the three-fifths rule gave the South an advantage in the Electoral Col-
lege (and the House of Representatives). It did. Instead, I deny that the
advantage was ever unquestionably decisive for the South in the Electoral
College.10 At best, the claim that Thomas Jefferson owed his first term to
the three-fifths rule is poorly argued. At worst, the claim is mistaken. In a
significant percentage of alternate, no-fifths rule Unions, Thomas Jefferson
would have still won the electoral vote.11
John Quincy Adams might very well have agreed with Freehling et al.
that Jefferson owed his first election to the three-fifths rule.  Commenting
5. Id. at 419.
6. Id. at 420; see also id. at 427.
7. Earl M. Maltz, The Presidency, the Electoral College, and the Three-Fifths Clause, 43
RUTGERS L.J. 439, 441 (2013).
8. Id. at 468–69.
9. Finkelman, supra note 1, at 412 n.38 (citing Paul Finkelman, The Proslavery Origins of
the Electoral College, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1145, 1155 (2002)); FREEHLING, supra note 1, at 147, R
559; SHARP, AMERICAN POLITICS, supra note 1, at 247; RICHARDS, supra note 1, at 43; Humes et R
al., supra note 1, at 464; Rakove, supra note 1, at 31; WILLS, supra note 1, at 2, 62, 234 n.2; R
DUNN, supra note 1, at 192; FERLING, supra note 1, at 168; ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 34; R
AMAR, supra note 1, at 345–46, 599 n.44; GRABER, supra note 1, at 115 n.30; Einhorn, supra note R
1, at 41 n.21; LEVINSON, supra note 1, at 90; LARSON, supra note 1, at 250; SHARP, DEADLOCKED R
ELECTION OF 1800, supra note 1, at 173. R
10. Elsewhere, I have argued that “while Southern states disenfranchised almost all their
black citizens and many of their white citizens, the Electoral College provided a mechanism to
protect the states outside the South from the overwhelming influence the solid South would have
had if presidential elections had been conducted by a national popular vote.” Michael L. Rosin,
The Five-Fifths Clause and the Unconstitutional Election of 1916, 46 HIST. METHODS 57, 57
(2013).
11. More properly speaking, the Jefferson-Burr ticket would have edged out the Adams-
Pinckney ticket by that vote. The present analysis ignores running mates Burr and Pinckney.
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on the impact of the three-fifths rule during the Missouri debates of 1820,
Adams made the following entry in his diary:
The impression produced upon my mind by the progress of this
discussion is, that the bargain between freedom and slavery con-
tained in the Constitution of the United States is morally and po-
litically vicious, inconsistent with the principles upon which alone
our Revolution can be justified; cruel and oppressive, by riveting
the chains of slavery, by pledging the faith of freedom to maintain
and perpetuate the tyranny of the master; and grossly unequal and
impolitic, by admitting that slaves are at once enemies to be kept
in subjection, property to be secured or restored to their owners,
and persons not to be represented themselves, but for whom their
masters are privileged with nearly a double share of representa-
tion. The consequence has been that this slave representation has
governed the Union.12
In an ironic twist of fate, it is at least as plausible that the president
who owed his election to the three-fifths rule was the very same John
Quincy Adams, the most ardent foe of slavery to occupy the Executive
Mansion before Abraham Lincoln.13 Without the three-fifths rule it is very
possible that Henry Clay would have been chosen president in 1824–1825.
Only one previous commentary appears to have suggested this.14
William Freehling, the earliest of these commentators on the election
of 1800, makes a very specific claim.
In an Electoral College where the three-fifths clause gave
Southerners 14 extra electors, the Republicans’ Thomas Jefferson
defeated the Federalists’ John Adams, 73–65. . . . If no three-
fifths clause had existed and House apportionment been based
12. 5 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, COMPRISING PORTIONS OF HIS DIARY FROM 1795 TO
1848, at 11 (Charles Francis Adams ed., New York, AMS Press 1970) (1874) [hereinafter ADAMS
MEMOIRS]. Adams was serving as Secretary of State in the Monroe administration when he made
this comment, which was undoubtedly about the balance of power in the House of
Representatives.
13. Adams made his views on slavery very clear in his diary entries made during the Mis-
souri debates. “I take it for granted that the present question is a mere preamble—a title page to a
great tragic volume.” 4 id. at 502. “Slavery is the great and foul stain upon the North American
Union, and it is a contemplation worthy of the most exalted soul whether its total abolition is or is
not practicable[.]” Id. at 531. “[A] law for perpetuating slavery in Missouri, and perhaps in North
America, has been smuggled through both Houses of Congress. . . .  The fault is in the Constitu-
tion of the United States, which has sanctioned a dishonorable compromise with slavery.” 5 id. at
4. “If the Union must be dissolved, slavery is precisely the question upon which it ought to break.”
Id. at 12. For an account of these diary entries, see WILLIAM LEE MILLER, ARGUING ABOUT SLAV-
ERY: THE GREAT BATTLE IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 179–93 (1996).
14. Humes et al. assert this claim but provide little supporting argument. See Humes et al.,
supra note 1, at 464. It is even more ironic that in 1804, while arguing for the replacement of the R
three-fifths rule by a no-fifths rule, the younger Adams claimed that his father had lost the 1800
election thanks to the three-fifths rule. Publius Valerius, Serious Reflections, Addressed to the
Citizens of Massachusetts, THE REPERTORY, Nov. 6, 1804; 3 WRITINGS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS
71 (Worthington C. Ford, ed., Macmillan 1914).
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strictly on white numbers, Adams would have likely squeaked by,
63–61.15
Of course, the three-fifths rule applied to the nation above the Mason-
Dixon line as well as below it.16 Neither Freehling nor, presumably, the
contemporary New England newspaper writers noticed that, without its
1790 slave population of 21,324, New York would not have been appor-
tioned its tenth House seat.17 Without New York’s tenth and final House
seat, Jefferson’s electoral vote total should be diminished by one to give
Adams an apparent 63–60 edge in the electoral vote.18
Or would it? Freehling et al. may declare unproblematically that in the
actual election of 1800 Jefferson owed thirteen of his seventy-three electo-
ral votes to the three-fifths rule, compared to only two for Adams. How-
ever, it is quite another matter to assert that Jefferson owed his election to
the three-fifths rule.19 In the context of the events leading up to South Caro-
lina’s secession from the Union, Freehling has written:
The point here—the caution that should always condition might-
have-been history—is that to think that one contingency will nec-
15. FREEHLING, supra note 1, at 147 (emphasis added).
16. Moreover, the three-fifths rule distinguished “free persons” from “all other persons,” not
“white persons” from “all other persons,” as Freehling’s text suggests. If the apportionment sup-
posed by Freehling et al. had been in place, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island would have each
owed their last House seat to their non-white free population.
17. The 1790 census counted a total of 340,120 persons in New York; of these, 21,324 were
slaves. J. PHILLIPS, RETURN OF THE WHOLE NUMBER OF PERSONS WITHIN THE SEVERAL DISTRICTS
OF THE UNITED STATES ACCORDING TO “AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ENUMERATION OF THE IN-
HABITANTS OF THE UNITED STATES;” PASSED MARCH THE FIRST, ONE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED
AND NINETY-ONE 3 (1793). All 1790 census data is taken from this source unless otherwise noted.
Forty percent of the slave count is 8,529. This reduces New York’s total population from 340,120
to a federal population with the three-fifths rule to 331,591, above the 330,000 needed for a tenth
seat with 1:33,000 as the ratio of representation. With no slaves counted, New York’s no-fifths
rule population would be 318,796, below the 330,000 threshold needed for a tenth seat with that
ratio.
18. In 1941, Albert F. Simpson cited contemporary sources that recognized that Jefferson
owed fifteen electoral votes to the three-fifths rule. Albert F. Simpson, The Political Significance
of Slave Representation, 1787–1821, 7(3) J. S. HIST. 315, 321–22 (1941). Freehling’s failure to
deduct New York’s last electoral vote from Jefferson’s column is hard to fathom. Just before his
analysis of the 1800 election, he reviewed the slave numbers in New York and the rest of the
North during the first forty years of the republic. FREEHLING, supra note 1, at 131–34. At the R
beginning of his analysis of that election, he asks: “But did the Virginia Dynasty, spawned by the
three-fifths clause, begin its reign democratically?” Id. at 147. He notes that “[t]hese questions are
superbly explored in Arthur F. Simpson[‘s article].” Id. at 585 n.3.
19. As Maltz notes, two large-scale surveys of the early republic have concluded that, in all
probability, Jefferson would have won a direct popular election in 1800. Maltz, supra note 7, at R
469 (citing STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITTRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM: THE EARLY AMERI-
CAN REPUBLIC, 1788–1800, at 741 (1993) and SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOC-
RACY: JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN 97–98 (2005)). I have no quarrel with this contention except to note
that I think it highly unlikely that a Convention unable to agree on common suffrage qualifications
for electors of the House of Representatives would have agreed on common suffrage qualifica-
tions much more relevant to a nationwide popular election of the president. In this article, I will
take on the analysis of the three-fifths rule in relative isolation on the assumption that it was
replaced by a no-fifths rule starting with the Convention.
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essarily change all subsequent history, without other surprise oc-
currences changing things again, is to deny the very nature of
contingency.20
Certainly, the other side of that historiographical coin must not be to sup-
pose that a contingency such as the adoption of the three-fifths rule happens
at one point in history and then no subsequent history changes until just the
right moment.
Had the Constitutional Convention adopted a no-fifths rule, that choice
would have undoubtedly had an impact on the choice of the ratio of repre-
sentation for the House of Representatives, initially at the Convention and
subsequently when the Second Congress reapportioned the House in
1791–1792.21
Part II of this article will scrutinize the steps that determined the size
of the Electoral College in 1800. It will argue that a plausible case can be
made that in a significant percentage of cases, Jefferson would have won
the electoral vote even if the Convention had adopted a no-fifths rule.22
On the final day of the Convention, Nathaniel Gorham proposed and
George Washington seconded changing the ratio of representation from no
more than 1:40,000 to no more than 1:30,000 as a means to increase repre-
sentation in the future.23 Part II.A will argue that this change in the ratio of
representation is the key unknown at the Convention for understanding the
result of the 1800 election in a no-fifths rule Union.
Part II.B will argue that if the Constitution had included a no-fifths
rule then the ratio of representation used in the first reapportionment of the
House certainly would not have been 1:33,000, as implicitly supposed by
Freehling et al. but a ratio between 1:25,000, and 1:30,000.
20. WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, THE ROAD TO DISUNION, VOLUME II, SECESSIONISTS TRIUM-
PHANT, 1854–1861, at 574 n.66 (2007). Finkelman notes that “[c]ounterfactuals are of course
impossible to prove, but possible and plausible scenarios help clarify these issues.” Finkelman,
supra note 1, at 424. R
21. No one has published a history of how the Convention arrived at the initial size of the
House of Representatives. The most recent history of the first apportionment is more than a cen-
tury old! Edmund J. James, The First Apportionment of Federal Representatives in the United
States, 9 ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 1 (1897). The author has been at
work on a large-scale analysis of the history of House apportionment among the states and how
that has affected the outcome of presidential elections.
22. Several commentators have noted that in several of the states the dominant party changed
the state’s method of choosing its presidential electors just prior to the 1800 election, hoping to tip
the balance in their candidates’ favor. The overall outcome of these changes was that Jefferson’s
electoral vote margin was smaller than the cumulative popular vote margin that the Jeffersonian
Republicans achieved over the Adams Federalists. See, e.g., FERLING, supra note 1, at 156–58; R
DUNN, supra note 1, at 175–87; SHARP, DEADLOCKED ELECTION OF 1800, supra note 1, at 116–25. R
There is no obvious reason to suppose that any of these state level machinations would have been
any different had the federal constitution embodied a no-fifths rule rather than a three-fifths rule.
Moreover, since the overall impact of these machinations favored Adams rather than Jefferson, the
present analysis will leave them all in place.
23. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 643–44 (Max Farrand, ed.,
Yale rev. ed. 1937).
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Part II.C will argue that for ratios of 1:25,000, 1:26,000, and 1:30,000,
the way in which the North Carolina legislature would have drawn a map
for thirteen or eleven presidential elector districts is the key unknown for
projecting the outcome of the 1800 election in a no-fifths rule Union. Jeffer-
son’s chances for a victory or even a tie are extremely slight for ratios of
1:25,000 and 1:26,000. At 1:27,000, this article projects Adams as a certain
winner. For ratios of 1:28,000 and 1:29,000, North Carolina would have
had twelve presidential electors in a no-fifths rule Union, just as it did in the
actual three-fifths rule Union. This article projects that in the case of
1:28,000, Jefferson would have edged out Adams in the electoral vote by a
count of 71–70 and that the two candidates would have tied for the case of
1:29,000. Finally, for a ratio of 1:30,000, this article projects Jefferson to
have just under a twenty-five percent chance to win the electoral vote.24
Part III will argue that a plausible case can be made that the president
who owed his election to the three-fifths rule was John Quincy Adams,25
the most ardent foe of slavery to occupy the Executive Mansion prior to
Abraham Lincoln. With a no-fifths rule in place, Speaker of the House
Henry Clay rather than William Crawford would have finished behind An-
drew Jackson and John Quincy Adams in third place in the 1824 electoral
vote. As Robert V. Remini, a leading historian of that era, has written, “In
that case [Clay] would have been elected President—unquestionably.”26
Part IV concludes the article by reviewing the analyses in Part II and
Part III as essays in both actual history and virtual history.
II. THE THREE-FIFTHS RULE AND THE ELECTION OF 1800
The standard interpretation that Jefferson owed his first term to the
three-fifths rule unproblematically supposes that in a no-fifths rule Union,
the Electoral College of 1800 would have been based on a House of Repre-
sentatives apportioned with 1:33,000 as the ratio of representation, as it was
in the actual, three-fifths rule Union. In order to project the outcome of the
election of 1800 with a no-fifths rule, the present analysis must first explain
the history leading to 1:33,000 as the ratio of representation with the three-
24. In the analysis presented here, none of Jefferson’s winning scenarios require eliminating
the senatorial, two-vote bonus, as suggested by Joyce Appleby and Lance Banning. Joyce Ap-
pleby, Having It All, WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 16, 2003), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
archive/entertainment/books/2003/11/16/having-it-all/99abb9f6-2737-4390-a857-ce20eb09e360/
?noredirect=on&utm_term=.56664f1070c4 (reviewing WILLS, supra note 1); Lance Banning,
Three-Fifths Historian, 4 CLAREMONT REV. BOOKS 54, 55 (2004) (reviewing WILLS, supra note
1).
25. Humes et al., supra note 1, at 464. R
26. ROBERT V. REMINI, HENRY CLAY: STATESMAN FOR THE UNION 250 (1991) [hereinafter
REMINI, CLAY]. Nearly a century earlier, John W. Burgess came to the same conclusion. JOHN
WILLIAM BURGESS, THE MIDDLE PERIOD, 1817–1858, at 140 (1901). Remini’s claim is based on
the supposition that Clay would have received expected electoral votes in New York.
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fifths rule and then rerun that history supposing a no-fifths rule. Not surpris-
ingly, the present analysis begins with the Constitutional Convention.
A. Setting the Ratio of Representation at the Convention
On the last day of the Convention, George Washington rose from the
chair to make his only speech of the Convention in support of Nathaniel
Gorham’s proposal that “the number of Representatives shall not exceed
one for every forty thousand” be changed to one for every thirty thousand.
There could be no opposition to Washington. The Convention unanimously
approved Gorham’s proposal. Forty thousand was erased in the parchment
and replaced by thirty thousand.27 This was the final step in the process that
set the ratio of representation at no more than 1:30,000 in the Representa-
tion Clause.
1. Sizing the Initial House with the Three-Fifths Rule
The three-fifths rule first appeared in April 1783 when the Continental
Congress passed a proposal with the following population-based tax appor-
tionment scheme:
[A]ll charges of war and all other expences that have been or shall
be incurred for the common defence or general welfare, and al-
lowed by the United States in Congress assembled, except so far
as shall be otherwise provided for, shall be defrayed out of a com-
mon treasury, which shall be supplied by the several states in pro-
portion to the whole number of white and other free citizens and
inhabitants, of every age, sex and condition, including those
bound to servitude for a term of years, and three-fifths of all other
persons not comprehended in the foregoing description, except
Indians, not paying taxes, in each State; which number shall be
triennially taken and transmitted to the United States in Congress
assembled, in such mode as they shall direct and appoint.28
On April 18, 1783, the Continental Congress applied the new tax ap-
portionment scheme to a requisition to raise 1,500,000 dollars from the
states based on population estimates recorded on April 7. Two years later,
the Continental Congress twice apportioned three million dollar requisitions
27. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 23, at 643–44. R
28. 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 260 (Worthington C. Ford
ed., 1905) (emphasis added). The Articles of Confederation required any amendment to receive
the unanimous approval of all thirteen states. This proposal never received the approval of all
thirteen states. AMAR, supra note 1, at 95. At the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, James R
Wilson remarked that the proposal had been approved by eleven states. 2 THE DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 452 (Jonathan
Elliot, ed., 2d 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES]. At the North Carolina ratifying convention,
William Davie stated that it had been approved by twelve of the states. 4 id. at 31.
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to the states in double the amounts.29 Table 1 presents these population
estimates and tax apportionments.
TABLE 1 ESTIMATED POPULATION AND TAX ALLOCATIONS
State Estimated  
Population 
$1.5M Tax 
Allocation 
$3.0M Tax 
Allocations 
New Hampshire 82,200 $52,708 $105,416
Massachusetts 350,000 $224,426 $448,854
Rhode Island 50,400 $32,317 $64,636 
Connecticut 206,000
 $132,091 $264,182
New York 200,000 $128,243 $256,486 
New Jersey 130,000 $83,358 $166,716 
Pennsylvania 320,000 $205,190 $410,378
Delaware 35,000
 $22,443 $44,886
Maryland 220,700
 $141,517 $283,034
Virginia 400,000 $256,487
 $512,974
North Carolina 170,000 $109,007 $218,012
South Carolina 150,000 $96,183 $192,366
Georgia 25,000 $16,030 $32,060
Total 2,339,300 $1,500,000 $3,000,000 
Edmund Randolph’s Virginia plan had specified neither the number of
representatives per state nor a total number.30 However, the Convention
quickly assumed that such a lower house would have about ninety mem-
bers. On June 8, during a discussion of the national legislature’s proposed
power to nullify state legislation, Gunning Bedford complained that his
small state of Delaware “would have about 1/90 [for its] share in the Gen-
eral Councils, whilst Pa. & Va. would possess 1/3 of the whole.”31 The next
day, the debate turned its focus to the nature of representation in the legisla-
ture with the small states complaining that they would be overrun by the
large states. David Brearley observed that “by the quota of Congs. Virga.
would have 16 votes, and Georgia but one.”32
29. For the population estimates, see 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra
note 28, at 231. For the $1.5M requisition, see id. at 259. For the $3M requisitions, see 28 id. at
217, and 29 id. at 745.
30. The text of the Virginia plan contains a blank space where a total number would appear.
It contains a list of state names in the margin. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, supra note 23, at 596.
31. 1 id. at 167.
32. Id. at 176–77.
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Brearley was clearly referring to the Continental Congress’s popula-
tion-based tax apportionment rule33 just discussed. Table 2 modifies Table
1 by presenting the data in descending population order, with the $1.5M tax
allocation column deleted and two columns added: (1) the quotient of that
state’s population divided by the smallest state’s population, 25,000, and (2)
that quotient rounded down to the nearest quarter, conveniently labeled
“Delegates.”
TABLE 2 THE WILSON TABLE RECONSTRUCTED
State Population  
Estimate  
(1783) 
Quota of 
$3M tax 
Quotient Delegates 
Virginia 400,000
 $512,974  16.00 16 
Massachusetts 350,000 $448,854 14.00 14 
Pennsylvania 320,000 $410,378  12.80 12 3/4 
Maryland 220,700 $283,034
 8.83 8 3/4
Connecticut 206,000 $264,182
 8.24 8
New York 200,000 $256,486 8.00 8
North Carolina 170,000 $218,012 6.80 6 3/4
South Carolina 150,000 $192,366 6.00 6
New Jersey 130,000 $166,716 5.20 5
New Hampshire 82,200 $105,416 3.29 3 ¼
Rhode Island 50,400 $64,636 2.02 2
Delaware 35,000 $44,886  1.40 1 ¼
Georgia 25,000 $32,060
 1.00 1
The first, third, and fifth column of this table are constructed from
James Wilson’s table of June 9.34 The initial size of the House was deter-
mined by taking 25,000, the three-fifths rule based apportionment estimate
of Georgia, which was the smallest state, using it as the ratio of representa-
tion, and rounding down.35 Call this the smallest state strategy.
33. Paterson’s comment that New Jersey would have five votes and Virginia sixteen votes,
and Wilson’s comment that Pennsylvania would have twelve votes and New Jersey five votes,
provide additional support for this claim. Id. at 182–83.
34. Id. at 190. Farrand describes this as “[a]mong the Wilson papers in the Library of the
Historical Society of Pennsylvania.” Id. at n.24. This same table also appears as Brearley’s table. 1
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 23, at 574. Farrand describes
this as “[a]mong the papers of Brearley relating to the Federal Convention, and turned over by his
executor, General Bloomfield, to John Quincy Adams.” Id. at 573, at n.12.
35. In November 1775, Silas Deane, a Connecticut Delegate to the Continental Congress,
proposed that “To every Twenty five Thousand Souls one Voice, or Delegate, shall be allowed, in
general Congress from each Colony respectively.” Silas Deane’s Proposals to Congress (Novem-
ber 1775), in 2 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 418 (Paul Hubert Smith ed.,
1983). There is no record that the Congress voted on or even debated Deane’s proposal. CHARLES
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Luther Martin from midsize Maryland offered a different objec-
tion than Bedford. Unequal confederacies can never produce good
effects. Apply this to the Virginia plan. Out of the number 90,
Virginia has 16 votes, Massachusetts 14, Pennsylvania 12—in all
42. Add to this a state having four votes, and it gives a majority in
the general legislature. Consequently, a combination of these
states will govern the remaining nine or ten states. Where is the
safety and independency of those states?36
He measured the top-heaviness of the Virginia plan by computing the
ease with which the largest states would be able to join together to impose
their will on the other states.
As June wore on, Madison wrote in his notes:
The great difficulty lies in the affair of Representation; and if this
could be adjusted, all others would be surmountable. It was ad-
mitted by both the gentlemen from N. Jersey, (Mr. Brearly and
Mr. Patterson) that it would not be just to allow Virga. which was
16 times as large as Delaware an equal vote only. Their language
was that it would not be safe for Delaware to allow Virga. 16
times as many votes.37
Another plan was needed; one that dampened the advantages of the
large states and was palatable to both large and small states in what Hamil-
ton termed “the contest for power.”38
The Convention appointed a committee chaired by Elbridge Gerry of
Massachusetts with one member per state, including Franklin rather than
Wilson from Pennsylvania, and Mason rather than Madison from Vir-
ginia.39 The fact that the Committee worked on July 3 and 4 while the
Convention adjourned to celebrate the nation’s independence attests to the
importance of its task. On July 5, the committee reported its proposal back
to the whole Convention.
I. that in the 1st. branch of the Legislature each of the States now
in the Union shall be allowed 1 member for every 40,000 inhabi-
tants of the description reported in the 7th Resolution of the
Come. of the whole House [the three-fifths rule]: that each State
not containing that number shall be allowed 1 member: . . . II. that
in the 2d branch each State shall have an equal vote.40
A. KROMKOWSKI, RECREATING THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 163 (2002). Two years later, the Conti-
nental Congress considered and voted down proposals that each state have one delegate for every
50,000 and then 30,000. 9 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 28, at 779–80.
36. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 23, at 440. R
37. Id. at 321 (emphasis added to first sentence).
38. Id. at 466.
39. Id. at 516.
40. Id. at 526 (emphasis added). For the reference to the three-fifths rule, see id. at 444.
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Yates’ notes record that Franklin initiated the Committee’s ultimate
proposal.41 In spite of his age, Franklin was undoubtedly still the most
mathematically gifted member of the committee.42 He may have noticed
that increasing the divisor from 25,000, the size of the smallest state’s pop-
ulation, to a larger number such as 40,000, one-tenth the size of the largest
state, while also guaranteeing each state at least one vote, would dampen
the larger states’ dominance in a population-proportioned House. Such a
change would curry favor with the small states. Call this the 10:1 strategy
to recognize the fact that 40,000 was exactly one-tenth of the apportionment
basis of the largest state.
Interestingly, the Committee’s July 5 proposal did not suggest what the
state-by-state representation would be. It did not even propose what the
total number would be. The committee may have lacked a population esti-
mate that separately counted slaves. The 1783 population estimates noted
by Wilson and Brearley43 did not count slaves separately. However, if any-
one had employed these population estimates,44 they would have ended up
with a fifty-six-member House. Table 3 presents the results of employing
the 1783 population estimates with a divisor of 40,000, rounding down, and
a minimum of one.
41. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 23, at 523.
42. For an analysis of Franklin’s mathematical prowess, see Paul C. Pasles, The Lost Squares
of Dr. Franklin, 108 AM. MATHEMATICAL MONTHLY 489 (2001), or more generally, PAUL C.
PASLES, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S NUMBERS: AN UNSUNG MATHEMATICAL ODYSSEY (2007).
43. See supra Table 2.
44. On July 6, 1787, Rufus King commented: “Delaware does not contain it is computed
more than 35,000 souls.” 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 23, R
at 541. It is likely that he did have the 1783 population estimates in mind.
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TABLE 3 REPRESENTATION ACCORDING TO THE 1783 POPULATION
ESTIMATE WITH A 40,000 DIVISOR
State Population  
Estimate  
(1783) 
Quotient  
(dividing by 
40,000) 
Delegates 
Virginia 400,000  10.00 10
Massachusetts 350,000  8.75 8
Pennsylvania 320,000  8.00 8
Maryland 220,700
 5.52 5
Connecticut 206,000  5.15 5
New York 200,000 5.00 5
North Carolina 170,000 4.25 4
South Carolina 150,000 3.75 3
New Jersey 130,000 3.25 3
New Hampshire 82,200 2.06 2
Rhode Island 50,400 1.26 1
Delaware 35,000
 0.88 1
Georgia 25,000  0.63 1
Total 2,339,300 56
On initially hearing the committee’s report, Gouverneur Morris ob-
jected. He expressed concern that many delegates were there only “to truck
and bargain for their particular States”45 rather than argue from first princi-
ples. A day later, the Convention responded by naming Morris chairman of
a new committee charged with proposing a first enumeration.46 On July 9,
this committee reported a proposal with a slightly different fifty-six mem-
ber House that shifted representation somewhat southward.47 Not content
with this proposal, which suggested that future apportionments be based on
state wealth as well as population, the Convention appointed yet another
committee, chaired by Rufus King, to resolve the enumeration and to deal
with the rules for future apportionments.48 King’s committee proposed a
sixty-five seat House, the proposal enshrined in Article I, Section 2.49 Table
4 compares the King committee’s sixty-five seat apportionment with the
fifty-six seat apportionment that Gerry’s committee had proposed.50
45. Id. at 529.
46. Id. at 540–41.
47. Id. at 559.
48. Id. at 557–62.
49. Id. at 568.
50. See supra Table 3.
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TABLE 4 FIFTY-SIX AND SIXTY-FIVE MEMBER APPORTIONMENTS
State Delegates  
Computed on  
1783  
Estimates 
Gerry  
Committee  
56 Member  
Proposal 
King  
Committee  
65 Member  
Proposal 
New Hampshire 2 2 3 
Massachusetts 8 7 8
Rhode Island 1 1 1 
Connecticut 5 4 5
New York 5 5 6 
New Jersey 3 3 4 
Pennsylvania 8 8 8
Delaware 1 1 1
Maryland 5 4 6
Virginia 10 9 10
North Carolina 4 5 5
South Carolina 3 5 5
Georgia 1 2 3
Total 56 56 65
Following a brief attempt by Madison to double each state’s represen-
tation,51 the ratio of representation remained at 40,000 until the Conven-
tion’s final days when Hugh Williamson proposed to “make an addition of
one half generally to the number allotted to the respective States; and to
allow two to the smallest States.”52 Only Washington’s support could
change the ratio of representation to 1:30,000 on the Convention’s final
day.53
2. Sizing the Initial House with a No-Fifths Rule
How would the history of the initial setting of ratio of representation
have unfolded with a no-fifths rule instead of a three-fifths rule?
Table 5 presents Greene and Harrington’s estimates for the white and
slave populations of the five southernmost states,54 extended to compute the
51. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 23, at 569–70. The
proposal was defeated by a vote of 2–9. Id. at 570.
52. 2 id. at 612. Williamson’s proposal was defeated by a vote of 5–6. Id. For explicit state-
ments of 40,000 by the Committee of Detail and the Committee of Style, see id. at 178, 566, and
591 respectively.
53. See supra text accompanying note 27. R
54. For the estimates in the order presented, see EVARTS B. GREENE & VIRGINIA D. HAR-
RINGTON, AMERICAN POPULATION BEFORE THE FEDERAL CENSUS OF 1790, at 127, 142, 160, 176,
182 (1932). They give no white/slave estimate for Delaware.
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white population as a percentage of the “federal” population computed with
a three-fifths rule.
TABLE 5 WHITE/SLAVE POPULATION ESTIMATES
State Year Whites Slaves 3/5 Slave 
Population
Federal  
Population
Whites:  
Federal 
Maryland 1782 170,688 83,362
 50,017 220,705 77.34% 
Virginia 1782
 296,852 270,762 162,457 459,309 64.63% 
North Carolina 1786 164,000 60,000 36,000 200,000 82.00% 
South Carolina 1785 108,000 80,000 48,000 156,000 69.23% 
Georgia 1773  18,000 15,000 9,000 27,000 66.67% 
Using the white-to-federal percentages in the rightmost column of Ta-
ble 5, Table 6 estimates the census data the Convention would have used if
it had adopted a no-fifths rule.
TABLE 6 NO-FIFTHS RULE APPORTIONMENTS
State 1783 est.
(3/5 Rule)
Whites: 
Federal 
Pct 
No-Fifths 
Rule  
est. 
Delegates, 
Smallest  
State  
Strategy 
Delegates,  
10:1  
Strategy 
New Hampshire 82,200 100.00% 82,200 4 2 
Massachusetts 350,000 100.00% 350,000 21 10 
Rhode Island 50,400 100.00% 50,400 3 1 
Connecticut 206,000 100.00% 206,000 12 5 
New York 200,000 100.00% 200,000 12 5 
New Jersey 130,000 100.00% 130,000 7 3 
Pennsylvania 320,000 100.00% 320,000 19 9 
Delaware 35,000
 100.00% 35,000 2 1 
Maryland 220,700
 77.34% 170,684 10 4 
Virginia 400,000
 64.63% 258,520 15 7 
North Carolina 170,000 82.00% 139,400 8 3 
South Carolina 150,000 69.23% 103,846 6 2 
Georgia 25,000 66.67% 16,667 1 1 
Total 120  53
An initial application of a smallest state strategy would have used
16,667 as the ratio of representation, thereby giving Massachusetts, the state
with the largest apportionment basis, twenty-one delegates to Georgia’s
one. In contrast, with the three-fifths rule in place, the actual Convention’s
application of the smallest state strategy yielded a less extreme ratio of only
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16:1.55  With this 21:1 ratio even more extreme than the 16:1 ratio, it is
likely that the Convention would have adopted something like the 10:1
strategy. Dividing Massachusetts’ free population of 350,000 by ten would
have yielded 35,000 as the ratio of representation. That ratio would have
reduced the size of the House from 120 to 53, just three shy of the total
generated by the actual 10:1 strategy with the three-fifths rule.56
An upward adjustment of the total by nine or so seats most likely
would have followed just as the King committee raised the actual total by
nine seats. However, there is no reason to believe that the ratio of represen-
tation would have been altered in this alternate history until the Conven-
tion’s final day when Washington supported Gorham’s proposal to change
the ratio as a means of increasing future representation.
Unfortunately, it may not be possible to know what ratio Gorham
would have proposed if the Convention had entered its final day with a no-
fifths rule apportionment of the House and a ratio of representation of
1:35,000 in Article I. He left no record of why he proposed 1:30,000.57 Was
he proposing a reduction of 10,000, a reduction of 25 percent, or did he
consider 30,000 to be a magic number?58 Perhaps all that can be said with
relative certainty is that it would have been one of 1:25,000, 1:26,000,
1:27,000, 1:28,000, 1:29,000, or 1:30,000.59
B. The First Reapportionment of the House
The first reapportionment of the House was in many respects the most
important reapportionment. Congress recognized that reapportionment of
the House needed to be enacted by legislation presented to the President.
Reapportionment was a matter of paramount constitutional importance and
55. See supra text accompanying note 35. R
56. Reducing the size of the House by more than half would have assuaged the oft-stated
concerns about the expense of the national legislature. For examples of these concerns, see the
comments of William Paterson, Oliver Ellsworth, and John Rutledge. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 23, at 251–52, 569–70. R
57. As a delegate to the Continental Congress, Gorham often complained about the absence
of state delegations. “[T]he principle of the confederat[ion] as it respects representation & the
mode of voting is calculated to encourage delinquency. . . if the representation had been appor-
tioned according to numbers or property—and a suitable quorum established & the major vote to
determine questions—this inattention would not exist.” Letter from Nathaniel Gorham to James
Warren (March 6, 1786), in 23 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, supra note 35, at 180.
58. Note that 30,000 like 40,000 is a multiple of 5,000, as were each of the apportionment
proposals made in the Continental Congress. See supra note 35. R
59. The ratios 1:25,000 and 1:26,000 result in the same electoral vote margins and specifi-
cally in the same number of electors apportioned to North Carolina and Maryland, the two key
states in the present analysis. See infra Tables 21 and 23. See infra text accompanying Tables 11
and 12, which will demonstrate that the Second Congress would have certainly replaced the ratio
1:27,000 with 1:28,000 since the former left significantly larger remainders than the latter.
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not simply a matter of housekeeping that could be handled by House
resolution.60
1. The First Reapportionment with the Three-Fifths Rule
When the Second House began its work to reapportion the House, it
read the constitutional text simply, divided each state’s apportionment pop-
ulation by 30,000, and rounded down61—an apportionment method that has
subsequently been named after Thomas Jefferson.62 This resulted in the
112-seat apportionment shown in Table 7.63
TABLE 7 ACTUAL THREE-FIFTHS RULE HOUSE REAPPORTIONMENT OF
1791: RATIO OF 1:30,000
State Basis  
Population 
Seats Remainder 
New Jersey 179,570 5 29,570 
Connecticut 236,841 7  26,841
Delaware 55,540 1
 25,540
Vermont 85,533 2
 25,533
Massachusetts 475,327 15  25,327
North Carolina 353,523 11  23,523
New Hampshire 141,822 4  21,822
Pennsylvania 432,879
 14  12,879
Georgia 70,835
 2  10,835
Kentucky64 68,705 2  8,705
Maryland 278,514 9  8,514
Rhode Island 68,446 2 8,446 
New York 331,591 11 1,591 
Virginia 630,560 21  560
South Carolina 206,236 6 26,236 
Total (wo/SC) 229,686 
60. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 130
(1997).
61. Proposed by John Laurance of New York on Oct. 31, 1791. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 148
(1791).
62. For a description of Jefferson’s method, see MICHAEL L. BALINSKI & H. PEYTON YOUNG,
FAIR REPRESENTATION: MEETING THE IDEAL OF ONE MAN, ONE VOTE 10–15 (Brookings 2d ed.
2001).
63. For the 1790 census data, see 1790 CENSUS, supra note 17, at 3. South Carolina’s final R
census data was not received until March 5, 1792. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 100 (1792). I have interpo-
lated South Carolina’s final apportionment population. Prior to that date, most proposed bills
omitted precise representation numbers for South Carolina.
64. The Kentucky Statehood Act became law on February 4, 1791, making provision for
Kentucky to be admitted to the Union on June 1, 1792. Kentucky Statehood Act, 1 Stat. 189. A
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The House quickly realized it would have to come to grips with the
problem of rounding and the remainders it left.65 Seeing that the ratio of
1:30,000 left the small states with large remainders, Hugh Williamson “ob-
served that such a ratio should be adopted as would leave the fewest frac-
tions, and at the same time do as much justice as possible to those States.”66
During the course of its debate, the House heard proposals for ratios of
1:33,000, 1:34,000, 1:35,000, and 1:40,00067 as it grappled with the prob-
lem of rounding. Table 8 presents remainders for all ratios from 1:30,000 to
1:40,000 (in increments of 1:1,000). None of the apportionments generated
by any of these ratios satisfied everyone.
TABLE 8—RATIOS OF REPRESENTATION AND THEIR REMAINDERS, FIRST
APPORTIONMENT WITH THREE-FIFTHS RULE68
Ratio of  
Representation
Remainder
(wo/SC) 
1:30,000 229,686 
1:31,000 247,686 
1:32,000 209,686 
1:33,000 142,686 
1:34,000 213,686 
1:35,000 224,686 
1:36,000 313,686 
1:37,000 338,686 
1:38,000 293,686 
1:39,000 211,686 
1:40,000 369,686 
After some debate, the House approved the choice of 1:30,000 as the
ratio of representation, first by a vote of 35–23,69 then by a vote of 43–12.70
On December 7, the Senate voted in favor of the House bill by a mar-
gin of 13–11 and sent it on to a third reading the next day.71 With passage
by both chambers almost in sight as the bill went to its third reading a day
subsequent act of February 25, 1791 provided Kentucky and Vermont each two seats in the House
until reapportionment. Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch.IX, 1 Stat. 191. Vermont became a state on March
4, 1791. Vermont Statehood Act, ch. VII, 1 Stat. 191. Hence, Vermont and Kentucky were always
included in apportionment proposals even before admitted to statehood.
65. See generally CURRIE, supra note 60, at 128–35 and James, supra note 21. R
66. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 154 (1791).
67. Id. at 149, 154, 169, 188.
68. The total remainders have been computed using South Carolina’s final census tally,
which was not received until March 5, 1792. Id. at 100.
69. Id. at 191.
70. Id. at 210.
71. Id. at 43–44.
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later, the Senate “expunged” the first section of the House version (contain-
ing 1:30,000 as the ratio of representation) and considered an amended ver-
sion based on 1:33,000 as the ratio of representation.72 Vice President John
Adams broke the tie in favor of the 1:33,000 ratio when Stephen Bradley of
Vermont, who had voted for the ratio of 1:30,000 the day before, cast the
key vote in favor of the 1:33,000 ratio, leaving the Senate evenly divided
12–12.73 Bradley must have switched his vote when he realized that a ratio
of 1:33,000 produced a smaller, 105 member House in which his state had
greater power than in a 112 member House.
The House and Senate remained at loggerheads over the ratio of repre-
sentation for nearly three months as the Senate’s change in the ratio was
seen as having “diminish[ed] the fractions to the Eastward, and increase[d]
those to the Southward,” in the words of North Carolina’s Hugh William-
son.74 With the two chambers unable to agree on a ratio of representation
for Jefferson’s method, the Senate resuscitated a proposal:
Made by dividing the whole aggregate numbers of the people of
the United States by thirty thousand, and apportioning them
among the several States by that ratio, until they shall respectively
have the number to which it will entitle them, and the residue of
said members among those States having the highest fractions.75
This proposal, using a method since dubbed the Hamilton method of
apportionment,76 resulted in a 120-seat House, with the eight extra seats
awarded to New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Delaware, North Carolina, and South Carolina. It barely passed the
Senate by a 14–13 vote.77
At first, the House rejected the Senate’s new apportionment by a vote
of 30–31.78 After the Senate voted to insist on its amendment by the same
14–13 vote,79 the House finally capitulated by the narrow margin of
31–29.80
The Senate’s insistence on its amendment would soon prove to have
been in vain. Concerned “that the vote for and against the bill was perfectly
geographical, a northern against a southern vote, and he feared he should be
72. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 46–47 (1791).
73. Id. at 47.
74. Id. at 244. Strictly speaking, Williamson erred when he said that the southern fractions
had increased. Not counting South Carolina, they had been reduced slightly from 77,677 to
71,677. But the impact on the northern states was much more dramatic, with a reduction from
152,009 to 71,009.
75. Id. at 105–06. March 12, 1792. The Senate voted down a motion to include this explana-
tory text by a vote of 7–20. Id. at 106.
76. For a description of the Hamilton method, see BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 62, at R
16–23.
77. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 105 (1792).
78. Id. at 473.
79. Id. at 111.
80. Id. at 482.
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thought to be taking side with a southern party. . .”81 President Washington
found constitutional grounds to issue his first veto.82 Following the advice
of Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, Washington made the following
objections in his veto message to Congress:
First. The Constitution has prescribed that Representatives
shall be apportioned among the several states according to their
respective numbers; and there is no one proportion or divisor
which applied to the respective numbers of the States, will yield
the number and allotment of Representatives proposed by the bill.
Second. The Constitution has also provided that the number
of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand;
which restriction is, by the context, and by fair and obvious con-
struction, to be applied to the separate and respective numbers of
the States; and the bill has allotted to eight of the States more than
one for every thirty thousand.83
Unable to override the first presidential veto,84 the House narrowly
voted for the Senate’s preferred ratio of representation, 1:33,000.85 On
April 10, the bill breezed through three readings in the Senate, which then
passed the bill without recording the vote.86 On April 14, President Wash-
ington signed the bill into law.87
2. The First Reapportionment with a No-Fifths Rule
Had the Convention enshrined a no-fifths rule in the Constitution, the
Second Congress would not have chosen 1:33,000 as the ratio of represen-
tation for the new apportionment starting with the third House in 1793. For
the sake of clarity, the present analysis is temporarily separated into two
81. Memorandum from Thomas Jefferson (mistakenly dated as Apr. 6, 1792, most likely
Apr. 4, 1792), in 4 MEMOIR, CORRESPONDENCE, AND MISCELLANIES, FROM THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 466–67 (Thomas Jefferson Randolph ed., 1829). 3 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 23, at 366.
82. In addition, by April 3, word got to Washington that Supreme Court Justice James Wil-
son also had grave concerns about the constitutionality of the bill. 23 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 377 editor’s note (Charles T. Cullen et. al. eds., 1950) [hereinafter JEFFERSON PAPERS].
One set of Washington’s editors reports that “GW apparently had earlier requested [Attorney-
General Edmund] Randolph to consult with U.S. Supreme Court justices James Wilson and John
Blair about the constitutionality of the Apportionment Bill.” 10 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASH-
INGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 222 n.1 (Robert F. Haggard & Mark A. Mastromarino eds., 2002).
83. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 539 (1792).  For Jefferson’s memorandum, see 23 JEFFERSON PA-
PERS, supra note 82, at 370–76. For Alexander Hamilton’s ineffectual memorandum in support of
the bill, see 11 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 228–30 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E.
Cooke eds., 1961–87). Jefferson’s vigorous analysis is riddled with errors, many of which were
only addressed forty years later by Daniel Webster during the apportionment debate following the
1830 census. See 8 REG. DEB. 94 app. (1832).
84. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 539 (1792). The vote was 28–33.
85. Id. at 548–49. The vote was 34–30.
86. Id. at 120.
87. See Act of Apr. 14, 1792, ch. XXIII, 1 Stat. 253 (apportioning Representatives among the
several states).
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parts. The first assumes that the maximal ratio of representation in the no-
fifths rule Union was 1:30,000. The second supposes it was a value between
1:25,000 and 1:29,000.
If the Convention had retained the requirement that “the number of
Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand,” the Second
Congress would have chosen 1:30,000 as the ratio of representation for the
new apportionment.
The Second House’s first gambit was to read the constitutional text as
written and try out 1:30,000 as the ratio of representation.88 In the hypothet-
ical no-fifths rule Union, this results in the following apportionment of
ninety-eight House seats shown in Table 9.
TABLE 9 NO-FIFTHS RULE HOUSE REAPPORTIONMENT OF 1791: 1:30,000
AS THE RATIO OF REPRESENTATION
State Free  
Population 
Seats Remainder 
Vermont 85,523 2
 25,523
Massachusetts 475,327 15 25,327 
Connecticut 235,182 7  25,182
Georgia 53,284 1  23,284
North Carolina 293,179 9 23,179 
New Jersey 172,716 5 22,716 
New Hampshire 141,727 4 21,727 
Delaware 50,207 1  20,207
New York 318,796 10 18,796 
Pennsylvania 430,636 14 10,636 
Rhode Island 67,877 2 7,877 
Maryland 216,692  7  6,692
Virginia 454,983 15  4,983
Kentucky 61,247 2  1,247
South Carolina 141,979 4 21,979 
Total (wo/SC) 237,376 
On seeing this large remainder, the House in the hypothetical no-fifths
rule Union would have no doubt looked for a better ratio, as the House in
the actual, three-fifths rule Union did.89 Looking at the remainders
presented in Table 10, the hypothetical House would not have found a ratio
better than 1:30,000.
88. See supra Part II.A.1.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 61–66. R
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\15-1\UST105.txt unknown Seq: 22  4-JAN-19 11:35
180 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:1
TABLE 10 NO-FIFTHS RULE HOUSE REAPPORTIONMENT OF 1791:
ALTERNATE RATIOS OF REPRESENTATION AND THEIR
REMAINDERS—1:30,000 TO 1:35,000
State Free  
Population
Ratio of Representation 
30,000 31,000 32,000 33,000 34,000 35,000 
Delaware 50,207 20,207 19,207 18,207 17,207 16,207 15,207 
Georgia 53,284 23,284 22,284 21,284 20,284 19,284 18,284 
Kentucky 61,247 1,247 30,247 29,247 28,247 27,247 26,247 
Rhode Island 67,877 7,877 5,877 3,877 1,877 33,877 32,877 
Vermont 85,523 25,523 23,523 21,523 19,523 17,523 15,523 
Small States Subtotal 78,138 101,138 94,138 87,138 114,138 108,138 
New Hampshire 141,727 21,727 17,727 13,727 9,727 5,727 1,727 
New Jersey 172,716 22,716 17,716 12,716 7,716 2,716 32,716 
Maryland 216,692 6,692 30,692 24,692 18,692 12,692 6,692 
Connecticut 235,182 25,182 18,182 11,182 4,182 31,182 25,182 
Medium States Subtotal 76,317 84,317 62,317 40,317 52,317 66,317 
North Carolina 293,179 23,179 14,179 5,179 29,179 21,179 13,179 
New York 318,796 18,796 8,796 30,796 21,796 12,796 3,796 
Pennsylvania 430,636 10,636 27,636 14,636 1,636 22,636 10,636 
Virginia 454,983 4,983 20,983 6,983 25,983 12,983 34,983 
Massachusetts 475,327 25,327 10,327 27,327 13,327 33,327 20,327 
Large States Subtotal 82,921 81,921 84,921 91,921 102,921 82,921 
Total (wo/SC) 237,376 267,376 241,376 219,376 269,376 257,376 
Free States 157,784 129,784 135,784 79,784 159,784 142,784 
Slave States (wo/SC) 79,592 137,592 105,592 139,592 109,592 114,592 
Of the alternate ratios within hailing distance of 1:30,000, only
1:33,000 offered any relief for the remainders. That relief was modest at
best and came at the expense of the smallest states and the slave states when
compared to the ratio specified in the constitutional text.90
Table 11 and Table 12 show the apportionment results that the Second
Congress would have faced if the Convention had chosen a more capacious
maximal ratio of representation than 1:30,000.
90. The ratio of 1:39,000 offered a remainder of 210,376 (excluding South Carolina). How-
ever, the smallest states and the slave states would have carried greater remainders in that seventy-
seven-seat House than in the ninety-eight-seat House resulting from a ratio of 1:30,000.
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TABLE 11 NO-FIFTHS RULE HOUSE REAPPORTIONMENT OF 1791:
ALTERNATE RATIOS OF REPRESENTATION AND THEIR JEFFERSON
APPORTIONMENT REMAINDERS—1:25,000 TO 1:30,000
State Free  
Population
Ratio of Representation 
25,000 26,000 27,000 28,000 29,000 30,000 
Delaware 50,207 207 24,207 23,207 22,207 21,207 20,207 
Georgia 53,284 3,284 1,284 26,284 25,284 24,284 23,284 
Kentucky 61,247 11,247 9,247 7,247 5,247 3,247 1,247 
Rhode Island 67,877 17,877 15,877 13,877 11,877 9,877 7,877 
Vermont 85,523 10,523 7,523 4,523 1,523 27,523 25,523 
Small States Subtotal 43,138 58,138 75,138 66,138 86,138 78,138 
New Hampshire 141,727 16,727 11,727 6,727 1,727 25,727 21,727 
New Jersey 172,716 22,716 16,716 10,716 4,716 27,716 22,716 
Maryland 216,692 16,692 8,692 692 20,692 13,692 6,692 
Connecticut 235,182 10,182 1,182 19,182 11,182 3,182 25,182 
Medium States Subtotal 66,317 38,317 37,317 38,317 70,317 76,317 
North Carolina 293,179 18,179 7,179 23,179 13,179 3,179 23,179 
New York 318,796 18,796 6,796 21,796 10,796 28,796 18,796 
Pennsylvania 430,636 5,636 14,636 25,636 10,636 24,636 10,636 
Virginia 454,983 4,983 12,983 22,983 6,983 19,983 4,983 
Massachusetts 475,327 327 7,327 16,327 27,327 11,327 25,327 
Large States Subtotal 47,921 48,921 109,921 68,921 87,921 82,921 
Total (wo/SC) 157,376 145,376 222,376 173,376 244,376 237,376 
Free States 102,784 81,784 118,784 79,784 158,784 157,784 
Slave States (wo/SC) 54,592 63,592 103,592 93,592 85,592 79,592 
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TABLE 12 NO-FIFTHS RULE HOUSE REAPPORTIONMENT OF 1791:
ALTERNATE RATIOS OF REPRESENTATION AND THEIR STATE-BY-STATE
JEFFERSON APPORTIONMENTS—1:25,000 TO 1:30,000
State Free  
Population 
Ratio of Representation 
25,000 26,000 27,000 28,000 29,000 30,000 
Delaware 50,207  2 1 1 1 1 1
Georgia 53,284  2 2 1 1 1 1
Kentucky 61,247  2 2 2 2 2 2
Rhode Island  67,877  2 2 2 2 2 2
Vermont 85,523  3 3 3 3 2 2
Small States Total 11 10 9 9 8 8 
New Hampshire
 141,727  5 5 5 5 4 4
New Jersey 172,716  6 6 6 6 5 5
Maryland 216,692  8 8 8 7 7 7
Connecticut  235,182  9 9 8 8 8 7
Medium States Total 28 28 27 26 24 23 
North Carolina 293,179 11 11 10 10 10 9 
New York 318,796 12 12 11 11 10 10 
Pennsylvania 430,636 17 16 15 15 14 14 
Virginia 454,983 18 17 16 16 15 15 
Massachusetts 475,327 19 18 17 16 16 15 
Large States Total 77 74 69 68 65 63 
Total (wo/SC) 116 112 105 103 97 94 
South Carolina 141,979 5 5 5 5 4 4 
Free 73 71 67 66 61 59 
Slave 43 41 38 37 36 35 
If the Convention had chosen 1:25,000 as the maximal ratio of repre-
sentation, the Second Congress might have considered changing the ratio to
1:26,000, which gave a slightly smaller total remainder. However, this
slight improvement would have cost Delaware a second seat.
If 1:26,000 had been the maximal ratio of representation written into
the Constitution, the Second Congress would have certainly employed that
ratio when it reapportioned the House. It yielded the smallest overall re-
mainder and any change from this maximal ratio would deny Georgia its
second seat.
With 1:28,000 leaving a significantly smaller remainder of 173,376
benefitting the small states and especially the large states, the Second Con-
gress would have been much more inclined to reject 1:27,000 in favor
1:28,000 as the ratio of representation when it resized the House. The ratio
of 1:28,000 achieved its advantages by benefiting the free states much more
than the slave states. This might have generated resistance to making the
change from 1:27,000 to 1:28,000, but most likely not. The practical impact
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of changing the ratio from 1:27,000 to 1:28,000 would have been limited to
one-seat losses for Maryland and Massachusetts.
The ratio of 1:28,000 left a smaller total remainder than any less capa-
cious ratio of representation. Moreover, a change to 1:29,000 would have
cost six states a seat in the next House (plus South Carolina as it turned
out). The only reason to change the ratio would have been to improve the
prospects of the slave states at the expense of the free states. It is hard to
imagine the slave states having the votes to make such a change, especially
since it would have cost Virginia a seat.
With 1:29,000 as the maximal ratio of representation, the Second Con-
gress would have faced the slight temptation to change the ratio to 1:30,000
to improve the total remainder. Although this would have benefited the
slave states more than the free states, it would have cost Connecticut, Mas-
sachusetts, and North Carolina one seat each. It seems unlikely that the
Second Congress would have made this change for such a slight improve-
ment in the total remainder.
C. The 1800 Electoral Vote with a No-Fifths Rule
A literal reading of Freehling’s claims is that replacing the three-fifths
rule with a no-fifths rule would have resulted in Jefferson receiving twelve
fewer electoral votes in 1800 than he actually did, and Adams receiving two
fewer electoral votes in that election than he actually did, and nothing more.
In an Electoral College where the three-fifths clause gave
Southerners 14 extra electors, the Republicans’ Thomas Jefferson
defeated the Federalists’ John Adams 73–65. If no three-fifths
clause had existed and House apportionment had been based
strictly on white numbers, Adams would have likely squeaked by,
63–61.91
The analysis of the 1800 election commences by correcting Freeh-
ling’s analysis, while maintaining the supposition that Congress would have
employed 1:33,000 as the ratio of representation for the first reapportion-
ment of the House. Having demonstrated that Congress would not have
used that ratio, the analysis focuses on the ratios (and methods) it would
have considered.
1. Freehling’s Analysis Corrected
The three-fifths rule applied to the nation above the Mason-Dixon line
as well as below it. In making his claim, Freehling failed to notice that New
York would not have been apportioned its tenth House seat without its 1790
slave population of 21,324.
91. FREEHLING, supra note 1, at 147 (emphasis added).  For a similar statement focused on
the three-fifths rule’s impact on just the South, see WILLS, supra note 1, at 2.
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With the claim that the Adams ticket captured two electoral votes due
to the three-fifths rule, Freehling’s analysis undoubtedly supposes that one
of these electoral votes is lost in Maryland and the other in North Caro-
lina.92 Table 13 reconstructs Freehling’s totals in a 123-member Electoral
College based on 1:33,000 as the ratio of representation in a no-fifths rule
Union, in which New York has eleven rather than twelve presidential
electors.
TABLE 13 FREEHLING’S ELECTORAL VOTE TOTALS RECONSTRUCTED
AND ADJUSTED FOR NEW YORK
State 1790 Free  
Population 
House 
Seats 
Electors Jefferson 
Ticket 
Adams  
Ticket 
Connecticut 235,182  7  9 0 9
Delaware 50,207  1  3 0 3
Georgia 53,284  1  3  3 0
Kentucky 61,247  1  3 3 0
Maryland 216,692 6 8 4 4 
Massachusetts 475,327 14 16 0 16 
New Hampshire 141,727 4 6 0 6 
New Jersey 172,716 5 7 0 7 
New York 318,796 9 11 11 0 
North Carolina 293,179 8 10 7 3 
Pennsylvania 430,636 13 15 8 7 
Rhode Island93 67,877 2 4 0 4 
South Carolina 141,979 4 6 6 0 
Tennessee 32,274  1  3 3 0
Vermont 85,523  2  4  0 4
Virginia 454,983  13  15  15 0
Total 91  123  60 63
The World Wide Web was just about to make its debut when Freehling
published The Road to Disunion in 1990.94 Among the many persons to
take advantage of the web, none is more important to scholars of the early
republic than Philip Lampi, who has devoted much of his adult life to col-
92. In addition to Maryland and North Carolina, Delaware was the only other slave state in
which Adams won electoral votes. Adams could not have lost any electoral votes in Delaware, as
that state had only three electors, the minimum number possible.
93. One of Rhode Island’s electors cast an electoral vote for John Jay. The present analysis
disregards that sloughed off vote when appropriate.
94. Posting of Tim Berners-Lee to https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/alt.hypertext/
eCTkkOoWTAY/bJGhZyooXzkJ (Aug. 6, 1991).
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lecting election data from that era95 and posting it on the Internet since
2007.96
Three states split their electoral vote in 1800: Pennsylvania, Maryland,
and North Carolina. Of these, Pennsylvania had the same number of electo-
ral votes in Freehling’s no-fifths rule analysis as it had in the actual three-
fifths rule election. Consequently, there is no reason to suppose that the
Pennsylvania legislature would not also have chosen eight Jefferson elec-
tors and seven Adams electors in this no-fifths rule election, just as it did in
the actual three-fifths rule election.
Maryland and North Carolina are another matter. Fortuitously, each
loses two electoral votes in Freehling’s no-fifths rule analysis compared to
the actual three-fifths rule election, leaving each state with a number of
presidential electors equal to the number of representatives it actually had in
the three-fifths rule Union. It is certainly reasonable to suppose that the
Maryland and North Carolina legislatures would have used the same eight-
district and ten-district plans that they actually used for three-fifths rule
congressional districts for the same number of presidential elector districts
in a no-fifths rule Union. Fortunately, each of these districting plans
respected county boundaries and that makes for an easy application of
county level voting data for 1800 from A New Nation Votes.
Jefferson and Adams split Maryland’s ten electoral votes in the actual
three-fifths rule election. However, as shown in Table 14, in a no-fifths rule
election with eight electoral districts, Jefferson wins five electoral votes and
Adams only wins three.97
95. Lampi’s data is available at Phillip Lampi ed., A New Nation Votes: American Election
Returns 1787–1825, AM. ANTIQUARIAN SOC’Y (2007), https://elections.lib.tufts.edu (last visited
July 30, 2018) [hereinafter A New Nation Votes]. Unless otherwise stated, all election data is from
this source. For Lampi’s remarkable story, see Katherine Mangu-Ward, The Orphan Scholar,
HUMAN., Jan.–Feb. 2008, at 36–37.
96. E-mail from Pamela Hopkins, Public Service and Outreach Archivist, Digital Collections
and Archives, Tufts University, to author (July 30, 2018) (on file with author).
97. For the data, see A New Nation Votes, supra note 95, at https://elections.lib.tufts.edu/
catalog/tufts:md.presidentialelector1.1800 through https://elections.lib.tufts.edu/catalog/
tufts:md.presidentialelector10.1800 (last visited July 30, 2018) (spreadsheet on file with author).
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TABLE 14 MARYLAND 1800 EIGHT ELECTORAL DISTRICT RESULTS
District Popular Vote Electors 
Jefferson Adams Jefferson Adams 
1 67 1,114  0 1
2 1,336
 1,074  1 0
3 920 2,125  0 1
4 2,482 2,182
 1 0
5 2,340 672  1 0
6 1,828
 753  1 0
7 1,460 613  1 0
8 196 1,485
 0 1
Total 10,629 10,018 5 3 
This should come as no shock to students of districting. Nor should the
fact that in a no-fifths rule, ten elector districting in North Carolina, Jeffer-
son’s 8–4 vote margin completely vanishes in favor of a 5–5 split.98 Table
15 presents the result of a ten elector districting in North Carolina.
98. See id. at https://elections.lib.tufts.edu/catalog/tufts:nc.presidentialelector.edenton.1800,
https://elections.lib.tufts.edu/catalog/tufts:nc.presidentialelector.edgecombe.1800, https://elec
tions.lib.tufts.edu/catalog/tufts:nc.presidentialelector.fayetteville.1800, https://elections.lib.tufts
.edu/catalog/tufts:nc.presidentialelector.orange.1800, https://elections.lib.tufts.edu/catalog/tufts:nc
.presidentialelector.morgan.1800, https://elections.lib.tufts.edu/catalog/tufts:nc.presidentialelector
.newbern.1800, https://elections.lib.tufts.edu/catalog/tufts:nc.presidentialelector.northampton
.1800, https://elections.lib.tufts.edu/catalog/tufts:nc.presidentialelector.raleigh.1800, https://elec
tions.lib.tufts.edu/catalog/tufts:nc.presidentialelector.rockingham.1800, https://elections.lib.tufts
.edu/catalog/tufts:nc.presidentialelector.salisbury.1800, https://elections.lib.tufts.edu/catalog/
tufts:nc.presidentialelector.halifax.1800, https://elections.lib.tufts.edu/catalog/tufts:nc.presidential
elector.wilmington.1800 (last visited July 30, 2018) (spreadsheet on file with author). A New Na-
tion Votes does not present voting data for North Carolina’s Edenton electoral district in the north-
east corner of the state, whose elector voted for Jefferson. The Edenton district consisted of the
following counties: Camden, Chowan, Currituck, Gates, Pasquotank, Perquimans, and Tyrell.
These seven counties combined with Bertie and Hertford counties to form the eighth congres-
sional district, and these two counties voted for Jefferson by 268–29 and 219–115. Consequently,
Jefferson must have carried the actual eighth congressional district. The voting data presented for
the eighth district is for Bertie and Hertford counties only.
Adams is the first case of not being able to fill in the blank in the following statement with a
non-negative integer.
In state S, candidate C owed _____ electoral votes to the three-fifths rule.
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TABLE 15 NORTH CAROLINA 1800 TEN ELECTORAL DISTRICT RESULTS
District Popular Vote Electors 
Jefferson Adams Jefferson Adams 
1 1,374 484 1 0
2 1,058 1,794  0 1
3 1,918 1,052  1 0
4 1,338 692
 1 0
5 1,555 582
 1 0
6 736 1,395  0 1
7 264 1,868
 0 1
8 487 144
 1 0
9 1,420 1,512  0 1
10 1,342 1,401  0 1
Total 11,492 10,924 5 5 
With these analyses for Maryland and North Carolina in hand, Freeh-
ling’s analysis of the 1800 electoral vote can be revised to what it would
have been in a no-fifths rule Union with the first apportionment of the
House using 1:33,000 as the ratio of representation. Table 16 presents this
revision.
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TABLE 16 FREEHLING’s Electoral Vote Totals Reconstructed and
Adjusted for New York, Maryland, and North Carolina
State 1790 Free  
Population 
House 
Seats 
Electors Jefferson 
Ticket 
Adams  
Ticket 
Connecticut 235,182
 7  9 0 9
Delaware 50,207  1  3 0 3
Georgia 53,284  1
 3  3 0
Kentucky 61,247  1  3 3 0
Maryland 216,692 6 8 5 3 
Massachusetts 475,327 14 16 0 16 
New Hampshire 141,727 4 6 0 6 
New Jersey 172,716 5 7 0 7 
New York 318,796 9 11 11 0 
North Carolina 293,179 8 10 5 5 
Pennsylvania 430,636 13 15 8 7 
Rhode Island 67,877 2 4 0 4 
South Carolina 141,979 4 6 6 0 
Tennessee 32,274  1  3 3 0
Vermont 85,523  2  4  0 4
Virginia 454,983
 13  15  15 0
Total 91  123  64 59
In Freehling’s 1:33,000, no-fifths rule Union, Adams wins the electo-
ral vote 64–59, not 63–61.
2. Freehling’s Analysis Replaced
Part II.B.2 demonstrated that Congress would not have employed
1:33,000 as the ratio of representation for the first reapportionment of the
House in a no-fifths rule Union. Instead, it would have employed a ratio
between 1:25,000 and 1:30,000, with a Jefferson-style apportionment.99 Ta-
ble 17 presents the maximum and minimum number of electors for each
state for these ratios of representation and apportionment methods along
with the number of electors in the actual three-fifths rule election as well as
the selection method.100
99. It is conceivable but unlikely that Congress would have passed and President Washington
would have signed into law a Hamilton apportionment. For the sake of brevity and completeness,
note 112 presents the final results for Hamilton apportionments with ratios of representation be-
tween 1:25,000 and 1:30,000. See infra note 112.
100. For a brief overview of elector selection methods in the early republic, see McPherson v.
Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 29–33 (1892).
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TABLE 17 1800 ELECTORAL VOTE PARAMETERS
State Selection Method Split 
Vote
Electors 
Actual Maximum Minimum 
Connecticut State Legislature N 9 11 9 
Delaware State Legislature N 3 4 3 
Georgia State Legislature N 4 4 3 
Kentucky Popular, by District N 4 4 4 
Maryland Popular, by District Y 10 10 9 
Massachusetts State Legislature N 16 21 17 
New Hampshire State Legislature N 6 7 6 
New Jersey State Legislature N 7 8 7 
New York State Legislature N 12 14 12 
North Carolina Popular, by District Y 12 13 11 
Pennsylvania State Legislature Y 15 19 16 
Rhode Island Popular, Statewide N 4 4 4 
South Carolina State Legislature N 8 7 6 
Tennessee Popular, by District N 3 3 3 
Vermont State Legislature N 4 5 4 
Virginia Popular, Statewide N 21 20 17 
Three states split their electoral vote (and have a number of electors
under consideration different than their actual number of electors): Penn-
sylvania, Maryland, and North Carolina. Projecting their electoral votes in
possible no-fifths rule Union merits careful attention.
With Republicans in control of its House and Federalists in control of
its Senate, Pennsylvania’s legislature almost failed to choose any scheme to
appoint electors.101 On December 1, 1800, the two chambers agreed that
each would nominate eight electors and then select fifteen by joint ballot.102
With Republicans holding a majority of the two chambers combined, they
got to choose the odd elector. The projections presented below suppose that
if Pennsylvania has an odd number of electoral votes, then the Jefferson/
Burr ticket wins the odd vote and that if Pennsylvania has an even number
of electoral votes, then the two tickets split them evenly.
After choosing its electors by statewide popular vote in 1789 and
1792, the Maryland legislature switched to a ten-district system in 1795.103
In the range of no-fifths rule possible Unions under consideration, Mary-
land has either ten or nine electors. For those cases in which Maryland has
ten electors, it seems reasonable to suppose that it would have used the
101. See FERLING, supra note 1, at 157.
102. See Act of Dec. 1, 1800, ch. MMCXLIX, 16 Pa. Stat. 493–94 (directing the manner of
appointing electors of a president and vice president of the United States).
103. See Act of Dec. 24, 1795, ch. LXXII, 1795 Md. Laws 66 (altering the mode of electing
electors to choose the president and vice president of the United States).
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same districting scheme it used in the actual, ten-elector, three-fifths rule
election. Jefferson and Adams each receive five electoral votes for these
cases. That leaves the cases in which Maryland has only nine electors.
Given its late autumn sessions, the Maryland legislature chose not to
wait for the Second Congress to finish its resizing of the House of Repre-
sentatives, an effort that lasted from late October 1791 to the middle of
April 1792. Instead, in late December 1791, the Maryland legislature passed
a bill to district the state for an eight or nine-member delegation. Each of
the plans created eight districts. In the nine-member plan, the Fifth District,
consisting of Baltimore City and Baltimore and Harford Counties, elected
two representatives.104 Again, it seems reasonable to presume that the Ma-
ryland legislature would have adopted the same plan in a no-fifths rule
Union, in which it chose nine presidential electors.
Applying A New Nation Votes’ data to the nine elector plan results in
Adams’s ticket winning only three electoral votes to six for Jefferson’s
ticket,105 as shown in Table 18.
TABLE 18 MARYLAND 1800 ELECTOR PROJECTIONS BASED ON 1791
NINE MEMBER PLAN
District Popular Vote Electors 
Jefferson Adams Jefferson Adams 
1 67 1,114  0 1
2 1,336 1,074
 1 0
3 920 2,125  0 1
4 2,482
 2,182  1 0
5 3,137 683 2 0
6 1,628 969 1 0
7 1,054
 1,045  1 0
8  5 826
 0 1
Total 10,629 10,018 6 3 
North Carolina receives between eleven and thirteen electors in the
range of no-fifths rule Unions under consideration. For twelve-elector
cases, it is reasonable to suppose that the North Carolina legislature would
104. See Act of Dec. 26, 1791, ch. LXI, 1791 Md. Laws 589 (directing the mode of electing
electors to choose the president and vice president of the U.S.).
105. Spreadsheets on file with author. A New Nation Votes provides town-by-town results for
Frederick County, which the 1791 nine-member plan split between districts three and four. A New
Nation Votes, supra note 95, at https://elections.lib.tufts.edu/catalog/tufts:md.presidentialelector3
.1800 (last visited July 30, 2018).
Jefferson is the second case of not being able to fill in the blank in the following statement
with a non-negative integer.
In state S, candidate C owed _____ electoral votes to the three-fifths rule.
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have employed the actual twelve-district plan enacted in 1792.106 With that
assumption in place, Jefferson receives eight electoral votes and Adams
only receives four.
Unfortunately, the North Carolina legislature left no suggestions about
how it might have districted the state to choose eleven or thirteen electors.
North Carolina’s actual, twelve-district plan respected county boundaries.
So did its plan for ten congressional districts.107 With fifty-eight counties,
there are a myriad of possible ways to draw eleven-district or thirteen-dis-
trict maps.
Rather than speculate on which districting the legislature might have
chosen,108 software has been developed to generate 50,000 such maps for
eleven or thirteen presidential elector districts,109 subject to the following
constraints:
• No county is split between districts.
• Districts must consist of contiguous counties.
• A potential plan is rejected if any district’s free population
differs from the average free population per district by more
than twenty percent.110
• In the actual ten-district and twelve-district maps drawn by the
legislature, the first congressional district is identical to the
first elector district. It consists of Burke, Lincoln, Rutherford,
and Wilkes counties. Given the legislature’s choice to retain
this district in ten-district and twelve-district schemes, it is re-
tained in the eleven-district schemes.
• As discussed previously, there is no data from A New Nation
Votes for the twelfth elector district. Consequently, it can only
be joined to counties that voted for Jefferson in the eleven-
district plans. There are only two such counties adjacent to the
twelfth district: Bertie and Hertford.
○ By fiat, in eleven-district plans, it is joined to Hertford
County, whose free population of 3,386 produces a district
closer to the statewide average, rather than Bertie, whose
free population was 7,465.
○ By fiat, in the thirteen-district scheme, the twelfth elector
district is retained as an elector district by itself.
106. See Act of 1792, ch. XVI, 1795 N.C. Acts 48–49 (directing the mode of electing electors
to choose the president and vice president of the U.S.).
107. See Act of 1792, ch. XVII, 1795 N.C. Acts 50 (directing the division of the state into
districts for the purpose of electing Representatives to Congress).
108. For discussions of the legislative politics of drawing the congressional maps, see DEL-
BERT HAROLD GILPATRICK, JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY IN NORTH CAROLINA 1789–1816, at
57–59 (1931); NORMAN K. RISJORD, CHESAPEAKE POLITICS 1781–1800, at 410–11 (1978).
Neither of these sources has anything to say about drawing the map for elector districts.
109. Source code and input files on file with author.
110. In addition, each of the runs generated a small number of cases resulting in a popular
vote tie in a district. These cases have been discarded from the results presented.
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With these constraints in place, the software generated the results
presented in Table 19 (for eleven electoral districts) and Table 20 (for thir-
teen electoral districts).111
TABLE 19 NORTH CAROLINA 1800 ELEVEN ELECTOR PROJECTIONS
Cases Percent Electoral Votes 
Jefferson Adams 
12 0.02% 9 2 
1,288 2.59% 8 3 
10,761 21.64% 7 4 
22,320 44.89% 6 5 
13,438 27.03% 5 6 
1,888 3.80% 4 7 
12 0.02% 3 8 
49,719  
TABLE 20 NORTH CAROLINA 1800 THIRTEEN ELECTOR PROJECTIONS
Cases Percent Electoral Votes 
Jefferson Adams 
8 0.02% 11 2 
523 1.05% 10 3 
4927 9.89% 9 4 
15467 31.06% 8 5 
18468 37.09% 7 6 
8723 17.52% 6 7 
1578 3.17% 5 8 
103 0.21% 4 9 
49,797  
With projections in place for the states that split their electoral votes,
projections of the nationwide electoral vote can be made. Because of the
distribution of results for North Carolina, the results are first presented ex-
clusive of North Carolina, these results are then summarized and then the
North Carolina distribution is added to complete the analysis.
Table 21 presents the results for the Jefferson-style apportionments,
exclusive of North Carolina. The table displays Jefferson’s electoral votes
first, then Adams’s. For example, the value in the cell for Pennsylvania with
111. In the eleven-elector projections, 229 plans failed the population per district test and
fifty-two resulted in a tied district. For the thirteen-elector projections, these numbers were sixty-
four and 139.
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[1:]25,000 as the ratio of representation is “10–9,” means ten electoral votes
for Jefferson and nine for Adams. Maryland’s results are highlighted.
TABLE 21 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1800 PROJECTIONS,
JEFFERSON–STYLE APPORTIONMENTS, NORTH CAROLINA EXCLUDED
State Ratio of Representation 
25,000 26,000 27,000 28,000 29,000 30,000 
Connecticut 0–11 0–11 0 –10 0–10 0 –10 0–9 
Delaware 0–4 0–3 0–3 0–3 0–3 0–3 
Georgia 4–0 4–0 3–0 3–0 3–0 3–0 
Kentucky 4–0 4–0 4–0 4–0 4–0 4–0 
Maryland 5–5 5–5 5–5 6–3 6–3 6–3 
Massachusetts 0–21 0–20 0–19 0–18 0–18 0–17 
New Hampshire 0–7 0–7 0–7 0–7 0–6 0–6 
New Jersey 0–8 0–8 0–8 0–8 0–7 0–7 
New York 14–0 14–0 13–0 13–0 12–0 12–0 
Pennsylvania 10 – 9 9 – 9 9 – 8 9 – 8 8 – 8 8 – 8 
Rhode Island 0 – 4 0 – 4 0 – 4 0 – 4 0 – 4 0 – 4 
South Carolina 7 – 0 7 – 0 7 – 0 7 – 0 6 – 0 6 – 0 
Tennessee 3 – 0 3 – 0 3 – 0 3 – 0 3 – 0 3 – 0 
Vermont 0 – 5 0 – 5 0 – 5 0 – 5 0 – 4 0 – 4 
Virginia 20 – 0 19 – 0 18 – 0 18 – 0 17 – 0 17 – 0 
Total (exclusive of 
North Carolina) 67 – 74 65 – 72 62 – 69 63 – 66 59 – 63 59 – 61 
Table 22 presents the simple cases in which North Carolina has twelve
electors.
TABLE 22 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1800, JEFFERSON-STYLE
APPORTIONMENTS, NORTH CAROLINA 12 ELECTORS INCLUDED
Ratio of Representation 
27,000 28,000 29,000
Total excluding  
North Carolina 62–69 63–66 59–63
North Carolina 8–4 100.00% 8–4 100.00% 8–4 100.00% 
Total including  
North Carolina 70–73 100.00% 71–70 100.00% 67–67 100.00% 
Table 23 adds in the range of North Carolina results for those cases in
which the state has other than twelve electors.
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TABLE 23 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1800, JEFFERSON-STYLE
APPORTIONMENTS, NORTH CAROLINA ELEVEN OR THIRTEEN
ELECTORS INCLUDED
Ratio of Representation 
25,000 26,000 30,000
Total excluding  
North Carolina 67–74  65–72  59–61 
North Carolina 
11–2 0.02% 11–2 0.02% 9–2 0.02% 
10–3 1.05% 10–3 1.05% 8–3 2.59% 
9–4 9.89% 9–4 9.89% 7–4 21.64% 
8–5 31.06% 8–5 31.06% 6–5 44.89% 
7–6 37.09% 7–6 37.09% 5–6 27.03% 
6–7 17.52% 6–7 17.52% 4–7 3.80% 
5–8 3.17% 5–8 3.17% 3–8 0.02% 
4–9 0.21% 4–9 0.21%  
Total including  
North Carolina 
78–76 0.02% 76–74 0.02% 68–63 0.02% 
77–77 1.05% 75–75 1.05% 67–64 2.59% 
76–78 9.89% 74–76 9.89% 66–65 21.64% 
75–79 31.06% 73–77 31.06% 65–66 44.89% 
74–80 37.09% 72–78 37.09% 64–67 27.03% 
73–81 17.52% 71–79 17.52% 63–68 3.80% 
72–82 3.17% 70–80 3.17% 62–69 0.02% 
71–83 0.21% 69–81 0.21%  
Table 24 summarizes the outcomes of the Jefferson-style apportion-
ment in terms of winners and ties.112
112. Jefferson fares somewhat worse in the Hamilton apportionments.
Winner Ratio of Representation 
25,000 26,000 27,000 28,000 29,000 30,000 
Jefferson 0.01% 0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
Tie 0.49% 1.05% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Adams 99.50% 98.93% 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% 100.00%
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TABLE 24 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1800, JEFFERSON-STYLE
APPORTIONMENTS—SUMMARY
Winner Ratio of Representation 
25,000 26,000 27,000 28,000 29,000 30,000 
Jefferson 0.02% 0.02% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 24.26% 
Tie 1.05% 1.05% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
Adams 98.93% 98.93% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 75.74% 
The outcome of the 1800 presidential election in a no-fifths rule Union
would have depended critically on:
• The maximal ratio of representation specified in Nathaniel
Gorham’s proposal on the last day of the Convention;
• Congress’s choice of a ratio of representation in the first reap-
portionment; and
• In some cases, the North Carolina legislature’s districting
plan.113
There is even a small probability that the electoral vote would have
ended in a (first-place) tie (at exactly half the total number of electors)
between Jefferson and Adams (and Burr), sending those three names along
with Pinckney and Jay to the House of Representatives.114 In that case,
113. Neubauer and Zeitlin have analyzed how the outcome of the electoral vote in 2000 criti-
cally depended on House size. See Michael G. Neubauer & Joel Zeitlin, Outcomes of Presidential
Elections and the House Size, 36 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 721, 721 (2003).
114. In a recent book calling for abolition of the Electoral College, Mark Weston claims that,
“were it not for the early Constitution’s infamous ‘3/5’ rule that allowed southern states to count
three-fifths of their slaves as population for the purpose of congressional and electoral apportion-
ment, Adams would have narrowly beaten Jefferson by an electoral vote of 70 to 68.” MARK
WESTON, THE RUNNER-UP PRESIDENCY: THE ELECTIONS THAT DEFIED AMERICA’S POPULAR WILL
71 (2016).
Weston provides neither analysis nor citations for this unique claim, which supposes that the
Second Congress was somehow fixated on creating a House of 105 members (before the admis-
sion of Tennessee).
A 105-member House based on the 1790 census can be achieved in a no-fifths rule Union in
one of two ways: a Jefferson-style apportionment based on a ratio of representation between
28,437 and 28,507, inclusive, and in round numbers, 28,500. Of course, such an analysis needs to
ask whether the Second Congress would have chosen a ratio of representation not divisible by
1,000, and if so, why would it have been 28,500, which leaves New Hampshire, South Carolina,
and almighty Virginia with remainders of at least 27,483.
A Hamilton apportionment based on a ratio of representation of 30,000 also yields a 105-
member House based on a no-fifths rule. This is the same ratio of representation in the actual text
of Article I of the U.S. Constitution, and as this article has shown, it might have been there in a
no-fifths rule Union.
Amazingly, each of these apportionments yields a 70–68 electoral vote victory for Adams
based on the following assumptions in the three states that split their electoral votes (showing
Jefferson’s electoral votes first).
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Alexander Hamilton would have had an opportunity to engineer the selec-
tion of Charles Cotesworth Pinckney as a compromise candidate.115
III. THE THREE-FIFTHS RULE AND THE ELECTION OF 1824
Perhaps no one has seen his presidential ambitions frustrated more cru-
elly than Henry Clay did in 1824. The final electoral vote recorded Andrew
Jackson with ninety-nine, John Quincy Adams with eighty-four, William
Crawford with forty-one, and Clay with thirty-seven.116 Table 25 presents
these results by state.
State Jefferson 
(28,500) 
Hamilton 
(30,000) 
Pennsylvania 9–8 8–8 
North Carolina 8–4 8–4 
Maryland 5–4 5–4 
The hypothetical allocations for Pennsylvania are based on the statute passed giving the leg-
islature the power to choose the electors. The hypothetical allocations for North Carolina match
the actual outcome. Given Jefferson’s small popular vote margin in Maryland, coupled with that
state splitting its electoral vote 5–5, the 5–4 split seems reasonable, but this article has shown that
a 6–3 split would have been more likely. That would have resulted in Jefferson and Adams (and
Burr) each receiving sixty-nine electoral votes, leaving no one with a majority.
115. For the actual House election of 1801, see FERLING, supra note 1, at 175–96. For Hamil- R
ton’s machinations on behalf of Pinckney, see id. at 142–43, 158–61.
116. 1 REG. DEB. 526 (1825).
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TABLE 25 1824 ELECTORAL VOTE, ACTUAL
State Selection  
Method 
Electoral 
Votes 
Jackson Adams Crawford Clay 
Alabama Statewide 5 5 
Connecticut Statewide 8 8 
Delaware Legislature 3 1 2 
Georgia Legislature 9 9 
Illinois District 3 2 1 
Indiana Statewide 5 5 
Kentucky District 14 14 
Louisiana Legislature 5 3 2 
Maine District 9 9 
Maryland District 11 7 3 1 
Massachusetts Statewide 15 15 
Mississippi Statewide 3 3 
Missouri District 3 3 
New Hampshire Statewide 8 8 
New Jersey Statewide 8 8 
New York Legislature 36 1 26 5 4 
North Carolina Statewide 15 15 
Ohio Statewide 16 16 
Pennsylvania Statewide 28 28 
Rhode Island Statewide 4 4 
South Carolina Legislature 11 11 
Tennessee District 11 11 
Vermont Legislature 7 7 
Virginia Statewide 24 24 
Total 261 99 84  41
 37
Following the election, Clay wrote to James Brown, “accident alone
prevented my return to the H. of R. and, as is generally now believed, my
election.”117 In spite of the accidents he suffered, Clay would have finished
ahead of Crawford in third place in the electoral vote in a no-fifths rule
Union.
A. The Electoral Vote of 1824
Even before Congress tallied the all but unanimous electoral vote for
James Monroe’s second term, well-placed observers speculated that the
117. Letter from Henry Clay to James Brown (Jan. 23, 1825), in 4 THE PAPERS OF HENRY
CLAY 38 (James F. Hopkins ed., 1972) [hereinafter CLAY PAPERS] .
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\15-1\UST105.txt unknown Seq: 40  4-JAN-19 11:35
198 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:1
election of his successor would devolve on the House of Representatives.118
Clay’s strategy all along was to garner enough electoral votes to be among
the “persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of
those voted for as President.”119 Clay fully expected he would win the
House election.120 Others expected his election via this scenario as well.121
1. Clay Finishes Dead Last
Clay’s first accident came in New York, a state in which the legislature
chose the electors.122 According to that state’s law, each house of the legis-
lature would choose a slate of thirty-six electors, with a joint vote of the two
houses resolving any differences between the two slates.123 Such a joint
vote was in order after the Senate chose a slate of twenty-nine Crawford
electors and seven Clay electors, and the Assembly chose a full slate of
Adams electors with the support of the Clay and Crawford factions.124
One hundred fifty-seven members were present when the legislature
met in joint session on November 15 to finalize its choice of electors. On
the first ballot, the seven Clay electors received ninety-five votes, twenty-
five Adams electors received seventy-eight votes, the Crawford electors re-
ceived seventy-six votes, and three ballots were left blank. With 157 mem-
bers present, the Crawford forces argued that seventy-nine votes were
needed for a majority. However, the Adams faction prevailed in their view
118. See Letter from William Plumer Jr. to William Plumer (Nov. 24, 1820), in THE MISSOURI
COMPROMISES AND PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS, 1820–1825, 55 (Everett Somerville Brown ed., 1926)
[hereinafter THE MISSOURI COMPROMISES].  For similar comments from the first half of 1822, see
Letters from Rufus King, in 6 THE LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF RUFUS KING 437, 456, 468
(Charles R. King ed., 1900) [hereinafter RUFUS KING] .
119. U. S. CONST. amend. XII. For the recognition that this was Clay’s strategy, see Letter
from Rufus King to Jeremiah Mason (May 17, 1822), in RUFUS KING, supra note 118, at 471;
Letter from Rufus King to Christopher Gore (June 5, 1822), in id. at 475; Letter from William
Plumer Jr. to William Plumer (Dec. 21, 1822), in THE MISSOURI COMPROMISES, supra note 118, at
81.
120. See Letter from Henry Clay to Josephus B. Stuart (Dec. 19, 1823), in 3 CLAY PAPERS,
supra note 117, at 544–45; Letter from Henry Clay to Francis T. Brooke (Jan. 22, 1824), in id. at
603; Letter from Henry Clay to Peter B. Porter (Jan. 31, 1824), in id. at 630; Letter from Henry
Clay to Charles Hammond (Feb. 22, 1824), in id. at 654; Letter from Henry Clay to Francis T.
Brooke (Feb. 26, 1824), in id. at 662; Letter from Henry Clay to Peter B. Porter (Apr. 26, 1824),
in id. at 743.
121. See Letter from Willie P. Mangum to Thomas Ruffin (Jan. 20, 1824), in 1 THE PAPERS OF
WILLIE PERSON MANGUM 109 (Henry Thomas Shanks ed., 1950); Letter from Willie P. Mangum
to Seth Jones (Feb. 11, 1824), in id. at 116; Letter from W. H. Haywood Jr. to Willie P. Mangum
(Feb. 23, 1824), in id. at 120.
122. Earlier in the year, Crawford’s supporters in the New York Senate had beaten back an
attempt to enact a law placing the selection of presidential electors in the hands of the voters. See
THURLOW WEED, 1 LIFE OF THURLOW WEED INCLUDING HIS AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND A MEMOIR
EMBELLISHED WITH PORTRAITS AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS COMPLETE IN TWO VOLUMES 105
(Harriet Weed ed., 1884).
123. ROBERT V. REMINI, MARTIN VAN BUREN AND THE MAKING OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY
73 (1959) [hereinafter VAN BUREN].
124. Id. at 76–77.
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that a majority of the 154 voting members was sufficient to elect the
twenty-five Adams electors and the seven Clay electors on this first ballot.
A day later, the legislature awarded the final four spots to Crawford
electors.125
Had Clay received seven electoral votes from New York and Crawford
four, the two of them would have ended up in a 40–40 tie in third place in
the Electoral College. But New York did not cast its electoral vote that way.
When the electors met on December 1, two Clay electors were absent and
replaced by Adams supporters. A third Clay elector voted for Jackson.126
With an Adams elector voting for Crawford, the New York electoral vote
was twenty-six for Adams, five for Crawford, four for Clay, and one for
Jackson.
Clay’s second accident came in Louisiana where a coalition of Jackson
and Adams forces aligned in an attempt to deny Clay the state’s five electo-
ral votes.127 These electoral votes slipped away from Clay’s grasp when
four key Clay-backers in the legislature were unexpectedly absent and three
more defected to the Adams-Jackson coalition. As a result, the legislature
narrowly voted for a slate of three Jackson electors and two Adams
electors.128
Had Clay swept Louisiana’s electoral vote, he would have finished one
vote ahead of Crawford in the Electoral College, even with the unexpected
outcome in New York. Had he carried Louisiana and had New York’s elec-
toral vote been cast as expected, Clay would have received forty-five elec-
toral votes to Crawford’s forty (with ninety-five for Jackson and eighty-one
for Adams).
125. Id. at 80.
126. Id. at 82. Remini writes that “It is futile to guess what took place during these two short
weeks [leading up to the electors’ vote].” Crawford’s biographer Chase Mooney writes:
Probably no one will ever know exactly what happened, but there have been several
speculations and accounts. Roger Skinner, writing to Van Buren on December 1, said
John Taylor (who had been appointed to one of the vacancies) was active, as was Am-
brose Spencer, in trying to secure six votes for Crawford. Hammond and others, accord-
ing to Skinner, said the Adamsites had violated a pledge to give Clay eight votes in
consideration of Clay’s friends’ support of the successful ticket. Jackson’s friends had
attended the meeting of the electors and had sought to effect a division of the votes
between Jackson and Adams.
CHASE C. MOONEY, WILLIAM H. CRAWFORD 294–95 n.63 (1974).
127. Letter from David Corbin Ker to Andrew Jackson (Nov. 23, 1824), in 5 THE PAPERS OF
ANDREW JACKSON 450 (Harold D. Moser et al. eds., 1996).
128. According to Jackson’s editors, two Old Hickory electors were chosen on the first ballot,
as was an Adams elector. The third Jackson elector was chosen on the fourth ballot, and the
second Adams elector on the fifth ballot. Id. at 451 n.1. Clay wrote to his friends that he had lost
the balloting by a vote of 30–28. See Letter from Henry Clay to Francis T. Brooke (Dec. 22,
1824), in 3 CLAY PAPERS, supra note 117, at 900; Letter from Henry Clay to Peter B. Porter (Dec.
26, 1824), in id. at 905.
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2. The 1824 Electoral Vote with a No-Fifths Rule
Clay’s candidacy would have survived these accidents in a constitu-
tional order grounded in a no-fifths rule.129
Before assessing the impact of a no-fifths rule, the present analysis
begins by determining which states were in play for Crawford and Clay in
their contest for third place in the Electoral College.130 The present analysis
looks for a somewhat better than actual case for Crawford and a somewhat
poorer than actual case for Clay to demonstrate the robustness of Clay
finishing ahead of Crawford in a no-fifths rule Union.
The following states chose their electors by statewide popular vote and
the present analysis supposes the same statewide winner regardless of the
number of electoral votes:131 Alabama, Connecticut, Indiana, Massachu-
setts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Virginia. Of these, Virginia voted for
Crawford and Ohio voted for Clay.
In Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, New York, South Carolina, and Ver-
mont, the legislature chose the state’s presidential electors.
Delaware’s legislature chose two Crawford electors and one Adams
elector.132 The present analysis supposes that if Delaware had four electoral
votes, its legislature would have chosen three Crawford electors and one
Adams elector.
The present analysis supposes that Georgia’s legislature would have
chosen a slate of electors for its native son Crawford regardless of the size
of the slate.
The present analysis takes Louisiana out of play on the supposition
that its legislature would have selected only Jackson and Adams electors.
129. The task here is to demonstrate that in a no-fifths rule Union, Clay finishes in third place
in the electoral vote, ahead of Crawford. This analysis supposes the changes to the presidential
election process made by the Twelfth Amendment. It is conceivable that such changes would not
have been made if John Adams had won the election of 1800, when an Adams elector in Rhode
Island cast his second electoral vote for John Jay rather than Adams’s running mate, Charles
Cotesworth Pinckney. In that case, as many as five names could have gone to the House, perhaps
including John C. Calhoun’s, who ran for vice president. It is important to note, however, that
constitutional amendments requiring electors to distinguish their presidential vote from their vice-
presidential vote had been introduced in January 1797. See 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 1824 (1797), and
February 1800, see 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 510 (1800).
130. See infra, note 169 for Jackson/Adams highlights. R
131. Theoretically, a split outcome could have resulted in a state that chose its electors indi-
vidually on a long ballot. There is no evidence that any of the states just listed were near to any
such outcome, and the present analysis discounts its possibility.
132. In the actual election, Delaware’s thirty-member legislature chose three electors from a
slate of eight candidates. Joseph G. Rowland, who voted for Adams, received twenty-one votes
from the legislature. Isaac Tunnell and John Caldwell, who each voted for Crawford, each re-
ceived fifteen votes. See H. Clay Reed, Presidential Electors in Delaware, 1789–1829, 14 DEL.
HIST. 1, 15 (1970).
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New York ultimately cast five of its thirty-six electoral votes for Craw-
ford and four for Clay, a difference of one in Crawford’s favor. The present
analysis supposes that if New York had had a larger number of electoral
votes, then Crawford would have received one more, and that if it had fewer
electoral votes, Clay would have received one less. That is, the present anal-
ysis supposes that if New York had any number of electoral votes other
than thirty-six, then Crawford would have received two more than Clay.
The present analysis supposes that South Carolina’s legislature would
have chosen a complete slate of Jackson electors regardless of the number
of electoral votes it had.
Likewise, the present analysis supposes that Vermont’s legislature
would have chosen a complete slate of Adams electors regardless of its
number of electoral votes.
The following states chose their electors by district by popular vote:
Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, and Tennessee.
In a hotly contested four-way race, Illinois’ voters chose two Jackson
electors and one Adams elector from its three districts. The analysis that
follows supposes a minimal ratio of representation of 1:30,000. Illinois had
a free population of 54,294 in 1820 so it always has three electoral votes
regardless of the ratio of representation considered in the present analysis.
As a result, neither Crawford nor Clay wins an electoral vote in any scena-
rio considered below.
Kentucky chose its fourteen electors in three multi-elector districts.
Clay won a minimum of 69.5 percent of the votes cast in each district. The
present analysis supposes that Clay wins all of Kentucky’s electoral votes
regardless of their number.
Missouri chose three Clay electors by district. Like Illinois, it never
has more than three electors when the ratio of representation is at least
1:30,000.
Tennessee chose its eleven electors by district. With Andrew Jackson
winning more than 90 percent of his home state’s popular vote, the present
analysis supposes that he would have won all of Tennessee’s electoral votes
regardless of their number.
Maryland and Maine merit detailed attention after a brief comment
about the apportionment of the House following the 1820 census.
On January 7, 1822, Congress began consideration of a bill to set the
ratio of representation at 1:40,000, creating a 213 seat House. Seven weeks
later, it approved that ratio after a wide range of others were considered.133
133. Ratios of representation between 1:37,000 and 1:75,000 were considered. All ratios
greater than 1:50,000 were voted down without a recorded vote. For the opening of the debates,
see 38 ANNALS OF CONG. 708 (1822). For the closing, see id. at 1171. For the most extreme ratios
during the debate of Jan. 17, see id. at 736. For the final statute, see Act of Mar. 7, 1822, ch. X, 3
Stat. 651 (apportioning representatives among the several states, according to the fourth census).
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The present analysis considers all ratios of representations between
1:30,000 and 1:50,000 in increments of 1,000. Table 26 presents the num-
ber of House seats apportioned to the states in play for Clay or Crawford for
each of these ratios of representation.134
TABLE 26 HOUSE SEATS BY RATIO OF REPRESENTATION IN A NO-FIFTHS
RULE APPORTIONMENT: CRAWFORD, CLAY STATES IN PLAY
1824
Ratio of  
Repr. 
House  
Size 
DE GA KY MD ME MO NY OH VA 
1:30,000 255 2 6 14 9 9 3 45 19 21 
1:31,000 244 2 6 14 9 9 3 43 18 20 
1:32,000 239 2 5 13 9 9 3 42 18 20 
1:33,000 234 2 5 13 9 9 3 41 17 19 
1:34,000 225 2 5 12 8 8 3 40 17 18 
1:35,000 215 1 5 12 8 8 3 38 16 18 
1:36,000 213 1 5 12 8 8 3 37 16 17 
1:37,000 207 1 5 11 8 8 3 36 15 17 
1:38,000 201 1 5 11 7 7 3 35 15 16 
1:39,000 194 1 4 11 7 7 3 34 14 16 
1:40,000 191 1 4 10 7 7 3 34 14 16 
1:41,000 185 1 4 10 7 7 3 33 14 15 
1:42,000 181 1 4 10 7 7 3 32 13 15 
1:43,000 175 1 4 10 6 6 3 31 13 14 
1:44,000 169 1 4 9 6 6 3 30 13 14 
1:45,000 168 1 4 9 6 6 3 30 12 14 
1:46,000 163 1 4 9 6 6 3 29 12 13 
1:47,000 161 1 4 9 6 6 3 28 12 13 
1:48,000 158 1 3 9 6 6 3 28 12 13 
1:49,000 150 1 3 8 6 6 3 27 11 13 
1:50,000 146 1 3 8 5 5 3 27 11 12 
When Congress resized the House in January 1802, it apportioned an
additional ninth seat to Maryland.135 A year later, the Maryland legislature
134. Using the following counts of free persons from the 1820 census: Delaware 68,240,
Georgia 191,333, Kentucky 437,585, Maryland, 299,953, Maine 298,335, Missouri 56,364, New
York 1,362,724, Ohio 581,434, Virginia 640,226. See Census for 1820, at 18 (1821), https://
www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/1820a-02.pdf.
135. See Act of Jan. 14, 1802, ch. I, 2 Stat. 128 (apportioning representatives among the
several states, according to the second enumeration).
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drew nine districts, choosing eleven presidential electors.136 Two districts
on the western shore chose two electors; the remainder chose one each. In
general, this districting respected county boundaries. However, Montgom-
ery and Prince Georges counties on the western shore and Dorchester
County on the eastern shore were split between districts.137
This districting remained in place following Congress’s resizing of the
House in December 1811, which left Maryland with nine Representa-
tives.138 The Maryland legislature made a minor change on the eastern
shore in February 1820. In 1817, it added a fifth election district to
Dorchester County.139 Three years later, in 1820, the legislature assigned
Dorchester County’s second election district to the state’s eighth presiden-
tial electoral district.140 Finally, in 1823, the legislature reassigned two elec-
tion districts in Montgomery County,141 as Congress’s resizing of the
House in March 1822 left Maryland’s House delegation unchanged at nine
members.142 By 1824, the division of Dorchester County into six rather
than five election districts resulted in election districts one through three
being joined with Caroline and Talbot counties and election districts four
through six being combined with Somerset and Worcester counties.143
136. See Act of Jan. 8, 1803, ch. LXX, 1803 Md. Laws 36 (“providing for the elections of
representatives of [Maryland] in the Congress of the United States, and of electors on the part of
[Maryland] for choosing a president and vice-president of the United States.”) The Act also drew
eight districts electing nine members of the House.
137. The interested reader may wish to consult Dennis Griffith’s 1795 map of Maryland. For a
zoomable version of the entire state, see Dennis Griffith, James Thackara & J. (John) Vallance,
[Map of the state of Maryland], 1:300,000, Library of Congress, https://hdl.loc.gov/loc.gmd/
g3840.ct000307. For a snapshot of just Dorchester County, see Dorchester 1795, 1000x900,
Dorchester Graves, https://dorchestergraves.com/history/maps/#jp-carousel-147.
138. See Act of Dec. 21, 1811, ch. IX, 2 Stat. 669 (apportioning representatives among the
several states, according to the third enumeration). The Maryland Session Laws for 1811, 1812,
and 1813 contain no statutes concerning redistricting congressional or presidential elector dis-
tricts. See Acts of 1811, 1811 Md. Laws; Acts of 1812, 1812 Md. Laws; Acts of 1813, 1813 Md.
Laws 181–227. Martis does not report a redrawing of Maryland’s House districts between 1802
and 1833. See KENNETH C. MARTIS, THE HISTORICAL ATLAS OF UNITED STATES CONGRESSIONAL
DISTRICTS: 1789–1983, at 234 (1982).
139. See Act of Jan. 27, 1817, ch. 127, 1817 Md. Laws 89 (appointing commissioners for the
purpose of dividing Dorchester County into five separate election districts).
140. See Act of Feb. 14, 1820, ch. CLXXI, 1820 Md. Laws 106 (reducing into one the General
Acts of Assembly respecting elections and regulating elections).
141. See Act of Feb. 24, 1823, ch. 218, 1823 Md. Laws 136 (relating to the second and third
districts for choosing electors of President and Vice President of the United States).
142. See Act of Mar. 7, 1822, ch. X, 3 Stat. 651 (apportioning representatives among the
several states, according to the fourth census).
143. I have not found a statute making this change in the assignment of Dorchester County’s
election districts. However, this is how A New Nation Votes reports the data. See A New Nation
Votes, supra note 95, at https://elections.lib.tufts.edu/catalog/tufts:md.presidentialelector8.1824,
https://elections.lib.tufts.edu/catalog/tufts:md.presidentialelector9.1824 (last visited July 30,
2018). See Act of Dec. 16, 1822, ch. 5, 1822 Md. Laws 4–5 (commissioning the division of
Dorchester County into six election districts).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\15-1\UST105.txt unknown Seq: 46  4-JAN-19 11:35
204 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:1
In 1824, Crawford won only 12.39 percent of Maryland’s popular vote
statewide.144 However, with more than 60 percent of his vote coming from
the eastern shore, he managed to win the eastern shore’s eighth electoral
district, the middle of its three districts.145 Adams won the district to the
south in a close race with Crawford146 and the district to the north in which
Crawford was not competitive.147 In a race lacking a Crawford elector,
Jackson won the district containing the eastern shore’s northernmost
county, Cecil County, combined with Harford County on the western
shore.148
With Crawford winning less than 6 percent of the vote on the western
shore, his only chance of winning more than one elector was on the eastern
shore. That could not have happened given the apportionment ratios under
consideration. With a free population of 299,953, Maryland would have had
between nine and five House seats, and between eleven and seven presiden-
tial electors. Table 27 presents the average single elector district sizes that
would have resulted.
TABLE 27 POSSIBLE NUMBERS OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS,
MARYLAND 1824
House Ratio of Representation Presidential 
Electors 
Average Single  
Elector District Minimum Maximum 
1:30,000 1:33,000 11 27,268
1:34,000 1:37,000 10 29,995
1:38,000 1:42,000 9 33,328
1:43,000 1:49,000 8 37,494
1:50,000 7 42,850
Table 28 presents the votes for Adams and Crawford on Maryland’s
eastern shore counties from Worcester County at the southeastern end to
Cecil County at the northern end.149
144. For the returns by county in each electoral district, see A New Nation Votes, supra note
95, at https://elections.lib.tufts.edu/catalog/tufts:md.presidentialelector1.1824 through https://elec
tions.lib.tufts.edu/catalog/tufts:md.presidentialelector9.1824.
145. See A New Nation Votes, supra note 95, at https://elections.lib.tufts.edu/catalog/tufts:md
.presidentialelector8.1824.
146. See A New Nation Votes, supra note 95, at https://elections.lib.tufts.edu/catalog/tufts:md
.presidentialelector9.1824.
147. See A New Nation Votes, supra note 95, at https://elections.lib.tufts.edu/catalog/tufts:md
.presidentialelector7.1824.
148. See A New Nation Votes, supra note 95, at https://elections.lib.tufts.edu/catalog/tufts:md
.presidentialelector6.1824.
149. See A New Nation Votes, supra note 95, at https://elections.lib.tufts.edu/catalog/tufts:md
.presidentialelector6.1824, https://elections.lib.tufts.edu/catalog/tufts:md.presidentialelector7
.1824, https://elections.lib.tufts.edu/catalog/tufts:md.presidentialelector8.1824, https://elections.lib
.tufts.edu/catalog/tufts:md.presidentialelector9.1824.
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TABLE 28 EASTERN SHORE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE FOR ADAMS AND
CRAWFORD, 1824
County Free Population Vote by County Crawford  
Margin(/Deficit) 
By County Cumulative Adams Crawford By County Cumulative 
Worcester 12,870 12,870 421 754 333 333 
Somerset 12,343 25,213 619 288 -331 2 
Dorchester 12,562 37,775 411 297 -114 -112
Caroline  8,477 46,252 317 689 372 260 
Talbot  9,653 55,905 747 496 -251 9
Queen Anne 9,351 65,256 427 30 -397 -388
Kent  7,382 72,638 469 21 -448 -836
Cecil 13,646 86,284 594 0 -594 -1,430
In the actual election of 1824, Dorchester County’s first and second
election districts were joined with Caroline and Talbot counties to form the
eighth electoral district. The remainder of Dorchester County combined
Worcester and Somerset counties to form the ninth electoral district. Table
29 presents the votes in these two electoral districts with Dorchester County
given in detail.150
TABLE 29 DORCHESTER COUNTY DETAILED ADAMS-CRAWFORD VOTE
1824, ACTUAL ELECTORAL DISTRICT ASSIGNMENTS
County  
/Counties 
Election District Actual  
Electoral
District 
Adams Crawford Crawford 
Margin  
(/Deficit) 
Caroline and Talbot 8 1,064 1,185 121 
Dorchester 
First District (Vienna) 8 56  49 -7
Second District  
(New Market) 8 82  83  1
Third District (Ferry) 8 13 90 77 
Fourth District  
(Cambridge) 9 59  8 -51
Fifth District 9 140  61 -79
Sixth District 9 60  6 -54
Somerset and Worcester 9 1,040 1,042 2 
150. The detailed data at A New Nation Votes for Adams’s Dorchester County vote sums to
410, one less than the total given for the whole county. A New Nation Votes, supra note 95, at
https://elections.lib.tufts.edu/catalog/tufts:md.presidentialelector8.1824, https://elections.lib.tufts
.edu/catalog/tufts:md.presidentialelector9.1824.
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Crawford would not have won both electoral districts with the legisla-
ture’s actual apportionment of Dorchester County’s election districts be-
tween Caroline and Talbot counties to the north and Somerset and
Worcester counties to the south and east. Nor could he have won both elec-
toral districts with any sensible apportionment of Dorchester County’s six
election districts. Table 30 demonstrates how two Crawford electoral dis-
tricts could be created by clairvoyantly dividing Dorchester County.
TABLE 30 DORCHESTER COUNTY DETAILED ADAMS-CRAWFORD VOTE
1824, CRAWFORD BEST CASE ELECTORAL DISTRICT
ASSIGNMENT
County 
/Counties 
Election District Electoral
District 
Adams Crawford Crawford 
Margin  
(/Deficit) 
Caroline and Talbot X 1,064 1,185 121 
Dorchester 
Fourth District  
(Cambridge) X 59  8 -51
Sixth District X  60  6 -54
First District (Vienna) X 56  49 -7
Fifth District Y
 140
 61 -79
Second District  
(New Market) Y 82  83 1
Third District (Ferry) Y 13 90 77 
Somerset and Worcester Y 1,040 1,042 2 
However, this hypothetical apportionment ignores two geographic re-
alities. First, the Vienna district was in the southeastern part of Dorchester
County, across the Nanticoke River from Somerset County. Second, the
Ferry and New Market districts were to the north of the Vienna district and
the New Market district, especially, was closer to Talbot County than Som-
erset County. There is no geographically realistic way for Crawford to have
won more than a single elector in Maryland.
In 1824,151 as in 1820,152 Maine chose two presidential electors state-
wide and one elector in each of its seven congressional districts. In the
actual election of 1824, John Quincy Adams defeated William Crawford
151. J. Res. LXXVI, 4th Leg., 1824 Me. Laws 350–52. A New Nation Votes presents Maine’s
1824 presidential elector data on a county-by-county basis with Penobscot and Somerset counties
presented together on the same web page as is the data for Hancock and Washington counties. A
New Nation Votes, supra note 95, at https://elections.lib.tufts.edu/catalog/tufts:me.electors.han
cock_washington.1824, https://elections.lib.tufts.edu/catalog/tufts:me.electors.somerset_penob
scot.1824 (last visited July 30, 2018). This gives the impression that, in 1824, no Maine county
was split between two electoral districts. That was not the case. Some of Maine’s counties were
split between two congressional districts. See Act of Feb 8, ch. 223, 1823 Me. Laws 52–53.
152. J. Res. XIX, 1820 Leg., 1820 Me. Laws 31.
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statewide and in all seven congressional districts to sweep Maine’s nine
electoral votes. What could the outcome have been if there had been a dif-
ferent number of electoral votes at stake?153
In the last presidential election prior to Maine’s separation from Mas-
sachusetts, the Bay State’s legislature chose all of the state’s electors.154
Four years before that, Massachusetts chose all twenty-two of its presiden-
tial electors from six districts even though it chose its entire House delega-
tion from single member districts.155 The district of Maine had the only
electoral district that chose a single elector. Maine’s two other electoral
districts chose three electors each.156
Maine’s Massachusetts heritage provided a rich variety of methods for
choosing presidential electors. Popularly electing two statewide and the re-
mainder from single elector districts was not one of them.157 By choosing
that method in 1820 and 1824, the Maine legislature made a clear choice
not to imitate its Massachusetts past.158
Crawford managed to win just under 25 percent of the vote in the race
for the two electors chosen statewide.159 Adams won the rest. (Neither
Jackson nor Clay was on the ballot in Maine.) In the seven electoral district
races, Crawford only came within hailing distance of Adams in the Cum-
berland district, in which the Crawford elector lost to the Adams elector by
only 156 votes (5.38 percent).160 Crawford’s next best showing came in the
neighboring York district to the south in which his electors won a mere
153. Maine was, of course, admitted as a free state on March 3, 1820. Act of Mar. 3, 1820, ch.
XIX, 3 Stat. 544. The 1820 census counted no slaves in Maine. Census for 1820, supra note 134, R
at 18.
154. J. Res. XIX, 1816 Leg., 1816 Mass. Acts 233.
155. Act of February 28, 1812 ch. CXLV, 1812 Mass. Acts 300.
156. The three districts in downstate Massachusetts chose five, six, and four electors each. J.
Res. LXXI, 1812 Leg., 1812 Mass. Acts. 94.
157. For a recapitulation of Massachusetts’ constantly changing methods of choosing its presi-
dential electors, see McPherson, 146 U.S. at 29–32. The closest Massachusetts came to the
method adopted by Maine was in 1796 when the legislature chose two electors and the voters
chose the remainder from each congressional district with the proviso that the legislature would
choose in case no candidate had a majority in a district. Id. at 31.
158. In 1820, the Massachusetts legislature adopted a two-statewide plus the remainder by
congressional district method a week before the Maine legislature did. J. Res. VI, 1820 Leg., 1820
Mass. Acts 245. Four years later, the Massachusetts legislature abandoned that method for the
general ticket system. McPherson, 146 U.S. at 32.
159. A New Nation Votes, supra note 95, at https://elections.lib.tufts.edu/catalog/tufts:me.elec
tors.at_large.1824.
160. A New Nation Votes, supra note 95, at https://elections.lib.tufts.edu/catalog/tufts:me.elec
tor.cumberland.1824.
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22.66 percent of the vote.161 Table 31 presents the popular vote for electors
by district and statewide.162
TABLE 31 1824 MAINE ELECTORAL DISTRICT VOTE
District Adams Crawford Adams  
Margin 
Crawford  
Percentage 
York  1,642 481 1,161 22.66% 
Cumberland  1,526 1,370 156 47.31% 
Lincoln  1,530 248 1,282 13.95% 
Kennebec  1,387 180 1,207 11.49% 
Oxford  1,093 107 986  8.92% 
Penobscot and 
Somerset  1,556 275 1,281 15.02% 
Hancock and  
Washington  1,406 393 1,013 21.85% 
Statewide 10,140 3,054 7,086 23.15% 
Crawford won twelve of twenty municipalities in the actual Cumber-
land district. If a different number of districts had been drawn, Crawford’s
best chance of winning an elector in one of them would have depended on a
district being constructed from just the right set of municipalities in the
actual Cumberland district. Outside of the Cumberland district, Crawford
won only eleven of 127 municipalities by an aggregate margin of only 326
votes. These eleven municipalities were spread out over six of Maine’s
other eight counties. In contrast, Adams accumulated a margin of 7,516
votes in the other 116 municipalities outside of Cumberland County.163
161. A New Nation Votes, supra note 95, at https://elections.lib.tufts.edu/catalog/tufts:me.elec
tors.york.1824.
162. See also A New Nation Votes, supra note 95, at https://elections.lib.tufts.edu/catalog/
tufts:me.electors.kennebec.1824, https://elections.lib.tufts.edu/catalog/tufts:me.electors.lincoln
.1824, https://elections.lib.tufts.edu/catalog/tufts:me.electors.oxford.1824.
163. A New Nation Votes reports data for all twenty-one municipalities in the Cumberland
District except Thompson Pond Plantation. A New Nation Votes, supra note 95 at https://elec
tions.lib.tufts.edu/catalog/tufts:me.elector.cumberland.1824. The municipality level data for the
rest of the state at A New Nation Votes is slightly incomplete. There is no municipality level data
for the Oxford district, just to the north of the York and Cumberland Districts, which contained all
of Oxford County and the five northernmost municipalities in Cumberland County. See A New
Nation Votes, supra note 95, at https://elections.lib.tufts.edu/catalog/tufts:me.electors.oxford.1824.
The municipality level data for the Cumberland district includes the town of Saco, which also
appears, properly, in the York district. As a result, the municipality-by-municipality data for the
Cumberland district sums to totals that exceed the totals presented for the district by exactly the
Saco numbers. See A New Nation Votes, supra note 95 at https://elections.lib.tufts.edu/catalog/
tufts:me.elector.cumberland.1824. Therefore, there must be municipality level data missing for
each of the districts other than Cumberland and Oxford because the district totals exceed the sum
of the municipality-by-municipality data.
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Understanding how the Maine legislature dealt with Cumberland and
York counties in the actual sevenfold congressional districting will help
projecting how it might have treated these counties while drawing a differ-
ent number of congressional districts.164
With seven House seats, Maine’s single member congressional dis-
tricts averaged 42,619 inhabitants each. The Maine legislature could have
drawn up a reasonable apportionment not dividing any county into multiple
congressional districts by first combining Penobscot and Somerset counties
in the northern part of the state, then combining Hancock and Washington
counties in the eastern part of the state, and finally leaving the other five
counties intact. Table 32 shows such a seven-district plan.
TABLE 32 SEVEN MAINE CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS PRESERVING
COUNTY BOUNDARIES, 1823
County County 
Population 
District 
Population 
Deviation 
York  46,283 46,283 8.60% 
Cumberland  49,445 49,445 16.02% 
Lincoln  53,189 53,189 24.80% 
Kennebec  42,623 42,623 0.01% 
Oxford  27,104 27,104 -36.40%
Penobscot  13,870 35,657 -16.34%Somerset  21,787
Hancock  31,290 44,034 3.32% Washington  12,744 
Statewide 298,335 42,619
In fact, that is just what the legislature did.165 However, that would
have left the Lincoln County district at nearly 25 percent above the state-
wide average and the Oxford County district at just more than 36 percent
below the statewide average.
Table 33 summarizes the municipality shifts made by the Maine legis-
lature to achieve a more balanced apportionment.
164. Readers of this Article may wish to consult Moses Greenleaf’s 1820 “Map of the State of
Maine” available in the Osher Map Library at the Smith Center for Cartographic Education at the
University of Southern Maine or in the Norman B. Leventhal Map Center at the Boston Public
Library. Moses Greenleaf, A Map of the State of Maine from the Latest and Best Authorities,
1820, OSHER MAP LIBRARY, http://www.oshermaps.org/browse-maps?id=47014#img0; Moses
Greenleaf, A Map of the State of Main from the Latest and Best Authorities, 1820, NORMAN B.
LEVENTHAL MAP AND EDUCATION CENTER,  https://collections.leventhalmap.org/search/common
wealth:6t053q062.
165. Act of Feb. 8, 1823, 1823 Me. Laws 52–53.
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TABLE 33 MUNICIPALITIES SHIFTED, 1823 MAINE CONGRESSIONAL
DISTRICTING
Municipalities  
Shifted 
From To Population  
Shifted 
6 Lincoln Kennebec  3,894 
3 Lincoln Oxford 4,567 
3 Kennebec Oxford  3,039
5 Cumberland Oxford 6,690 
This apportionment, which left York County in the southernmost part
of Maine intact and shifted its eastern neighbor Cumberland County’s five
northernmost municipalities (Baldwin, Bridgton, Harrison, Minot, and Otis-
field) to the Oxford district, resulted in the following sized congressional
districts, shown in Table 34.
TABLE 34 ACTUAL MAINE CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS (1823)
District District  
Population
Deviation
York  46,283 8.60%
Cumberland  42,755 0.32%
Lincoln  44,728 4.95%
Kennebec  43,478 2.01%
Oxford  41,400 -2.86%
Penobscot and 
Somerset  35,657 -16.34%
Hancock and 
Washington  44,034 3.32%
Statewide 298,335 
In this actual apportionment, the smallest district, Penobscot and Som-
erset, was just over 16 percent below the average district size and the largest
district, York, was a mere 8.6 percent larger than the average district size.
Exclusive of Maine, Clay’s projected electoral vote margin over Craw-
ford in a no-fifths rule republic is smallest for ratios of representation of
1:45,000 and 1:49,000. For these ratios, Maine has six House seats.166
Therefore, the present analysis focuses attention on how six House districts
could have been drawn in Maine.
Maine’s legislature would have surely begun a six-district apportion-
ment by leaving its four largest counties (York, Cumberland, Lincoln, and
Kennebec) intact, combining the three easternmost counties (Hancock, Pe-
166. See infra Table 40.
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nobscot, and Washington) into one district, and combining its two other
northern counties (Oxford and Somerset) into another. This would have re-
sulted in the following initial apportionment that splits no county into multi-
ple districts, as shown in Table 35.
TABLE 35 SIX CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS PRESERVING MAINE COUNTY
BOUNDARIES (1823)
County County 
Population
District 
Population
Difference
York  46,283 46,283 -6.92%
Cumberland  49,445 49,445 -0.56%
Lincoln  53,189 53,189 6.97%
Kennebec  42,623 42,623 -14.28%
Oxford  27,104 48,891 -1.67%Somerset  21,787 
Hancock  31,290 
57,904 16.45%Penobscot  13,870 
Washington  12,744 
Statewide 298,335 49,723 
To improve on this initial apportionment, the legislature would have
shifted municipalities from western Hancock County to the Kennebec dis-
trict.167 Cumberland and York counties would have been left intact.
Crawford would not have won any of these six electoral districts. Nor
would he have won any electors if Maine had been apportioned only five
House seats with 1:50,000 as the ratio of representation. With five House
seats, Maine’s average congressional district size would have been 59,667.
The state’s legislature would have had three options for Cumberland
County.
The first option would have been to leave Cumberland County intact.
That would have resulted in an Adams victory in the countywide district.
The legislature’s second option would have divided Oxford County
between a York district and a Cumberland district. York County is Maine’s
southwestern most county. Cumberland County lies up the coast to the east.
Oxford lies on top of them to the north. In 1820, these three counties had a
combined population of 122,832, just a little more than twice the five-dis-
trict average size. If the legislature had pursued this second option, Craw-
167. Hancock County’s nine westernmost municipalities (Belfast, Belmont, Brooks, Jackson,
Knox, Lincolnville, Northport, Scarsmont, Thorndike) had a total population of 7,484. Shifting
these municipalities to the Kennebec district would have given that district 50,107 inhabitants, a
mere 0.77 percent above the six-district average. A population of 50,420 would have remained in
the Hancock, Penobscot, and Washington district, just 1.40 percent above the six-district average.
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ford would not have won either of these districts given his losses in the
actual York and Cumberland districts and his less than 10 percent share of
the Oxford district vote.
The legislature’s final option would have been to split off part of Cum-
berland County and join it to York County in a York district. That would
have been of no avail to Crawford. His aggregate margin of 403 votes in the
twelve Cumberland County municipalities he carried was far exceeded by
Adams’ 1,161 vote margin in the actual York district.
Crawford could have won a single electoral district centered on his
Cumberland County core if Maine had eight or nine House seats. With
those numbers of House seats, the average district sizes would have been
37,292 and 33,148 respectively. These would have been too small for York
County’s 46,283 inhabitants to be left intact as a congressional district by
themselves.
Crawford’s Cumberland County core consisted of ten municipalities in
the southern part of the county. Crawford’s core includes two towns that did
not vote for him: Gorham on the York County line and Portland, which is
surrounded by Crawford towns. Table 36 presents the relevant data for
Crawford’s Cumberland core.168 (The towns are presented in alphabetical
order.)
TABLE 36 CRAWFORD’s Cumberland County Core
Town Adams Crawford Crawford  
Margin 
Population 
Cape Elizabeth  13  67 54  1,688 
Falmouth  16  39 23  1,673 
Gorham  63  60 -3  2,795 
Gray  34  59 25  1,479 
Portland 600 416 -184  8,581
Scarborough  35  85 50  2,232 
Standish  52  71 19  1,619 
Westbrook  56 163 107  2,502
Windham   7  27 20  1,793 
Crawford  
Cumberland  
Core Total 
876 987 111 24,362
Crawford’s Cumberland core combined with all of York County had a
population of 70,645, just about the right size to construct two congres-
sional districts out of a total of eight or nine. Table 37 shows how such a
168. A New Nation Votes, supra note 95, at https://elections.lib.tufts.edu/catalog/
tufts:me.elector.cumberland.1824.
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district could have been constructed while leaving the remaining part of
York County with the right size population to form a district.
TABLE 37 CONSTRUCTING A CRAWFORD DISTRICT
Town Adams Crawford Crawford 
Margin 
Popu-
lation 
Crawford
District 
Margin 
Crawford 
District  
Size 
York  
District 
Size 
Crawford  
Cumberland  
Core Total 
876 987 111 24,362 111 24,362 46,283 
Cornish 34
 4 -30 1,088  81 25,450 45,195
Limington 0 0 0 2,122 81 27,572 43,073 
Parsonsfield 46 55 9 2,355 90 29,927 40,718 
Limerick 41 28 -13 1,377 77 31,304 39,341 
Waterborough  22  42 20 1,762  97 33,066 37,579
Alfred 7  85
 78 1,271  175 34,337 36,308
Buxton 110  24 -86 2,590  89 36,927 33,718
Hollis 72  20 -52
 1,762
 37 38,689 31,956
To make a best case for Crawford (and worst case for Clay), the pre-
sent analysis supposes that Crawford would have won a single electoral
district if Maine had been apportioned eight or nine House seats in 1822.
Table 38 summarizes the suppositions just made. (EV represents the
state’s number of electoral votes.)
TABLE 38—SUMMARY OF ELECTORAL VOTE ASSUMPTIONS FOR
CRAWFORD AND CLAY
State Clay Crawford Clay  
Margin over 
Crawford 
Crawford  
Margin over 
Clay 
Delaware 0 EV–1 EV–1 
Georgia 0 EV EV 
Kentucky EV 0 EV 
Maine 0 if EV>9, then 1, otherwise 0 
if EV>9, then  
1, otherwise 0 
Maryland 0 1 1 
Missouri EV 0 EV 
New York if EV<36 then 3, otherwise 4 
if EV>36 then 
6, otherwise 5 
if EV=36 then 
1, otherwise 2 
Ohio EV 0 EV 
Virginia 0 EV EV 
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Table 39 applies the electoral vote assumptions for Clay and Crawford
presented in Table 38 to the state-by-state apportionments shown just
above. (In the New York column, “4–6” indicates four Clay electors and six
Crawford electors.)
TABLE 39 PROJECTED ELECTORS FOR CLAY AND CRAWFORD BASED ON
A NO-FIFTHS RULE APPORTIONMENT, STATES IN PLAY, 1824
Ratio of  
Repr. 
Total  
Electoral  
Votes 
Clay Electors–Crawford Electors 
DE GA KY MD ME MO NY OH VA 
1:30,000 303 0–3 0–8 16–0 0–1 0–1 3–0 4–6 21–0 0–23 
1:31,000 292 0–3 0–8 16–0 0–1 0–1 3–0 4–6 20–0 0–22 
1:32,000 287 0–3 0–7 15–0 0–1 0–1 3–0 4–6 20–0 0–22 
1:33,000 282 0–3 0–7 15–0 0–1 0–1 3–0 4–6 19–0 0–21 
1:34,000 273 0–3 0–7 14–0 0–1 0–1 3–0 4–6 19–0 0–20 
1:35,000 263 0–2 0–7 14–0 0–1 0–1 3–0 4–6 18–0 0–20 
1:36,000 261 0–2 0–7 14–0 0–1 0–1 3–0 4–6 18–0 0–19 
1:37,000 255 0–2 0–7 13–0 0–1 0–1 3–0 4–6 17–0 0–19 
1:38,000 249 0–2 0–7 13–0 0–1 0–0 3–0 4–6 17–0 0–18 
1:39,000 242 0–2 0–6 13–0 0–1 0–0 3–0 4–5 16–0 0–18 
1:40,000 239 0–2 0–6 12–0 0–1 0–0 3–0 4–5 16–0 0–18 
1:41,000 233 0–2 0–6 12–0 0–1 0–0 3–0 3–5 16–0 0–17 
1:42,000 229 0–2 0–6 12–0 0–1 0–0 3–0 3–5 15–0 0–17 
1:43,000 223 0–2 0–6 12–0 0–1 0–0 3–0 3–5 15–0 0–16 
1:44,000 217 0–2 0–6 11–0 0–1 0–0 3–0 3–5 15–0 0–16 
1:45,000 216 0–2 0–6 11–0 0–1 0–0 3–0 3–5 14–0 0–16 
1:46,000 211 0–2 0–6 11–0 0–1 0–0 3–0 3–5 14–0 0–15 
1:47,000 209 0–2 0–6 11–0 0–1 0–0 3–0 3–5 14–0 0–15 
1:48,000 206 0–2 0–5 11–0 0–1 0–0 3–0 3–5 14–0 0–15 
1:49,000 198 0–2 0–5 10–0 0–1 0–0 3–0 3–5 13–0 0–15 
1:50,000 194 0–2 0–5 10–0 0–1 0–0 3–0 3–5 13–0 0–14 
Using these state-by-state electoral vote projections, Table 40 presents
the outcome of the race for third-place between Clay and Crawford.169
169. In the actual election based on the three-fifths rule, Jackson received 37.9 percent and
Adams received 32.2 percent of the 261 electoral votes. Jackson’s share of the electoral vote based
on the no-fifths rule apportionments presented here ranges from 37.56 percent to 36.79 percent,
Adams’ share ranges from 34.90 percent to 34.10 percent, so Jackson’s margin over Adams
ranges from 3.45 percent to 2.07 percent. Spreadsheet on file with author.
Robert Pierce Forbes claims otherwise. He claims that without the three-fifths rule, Jackson
would have received 77 electoral votes to 83 for Adams. ROBERT PIERCE FORBES, THE MISSOURI
COMPROMISE AND ITS AFTERMATH: SLAVERY AND THE MEANING OF AMERICA 218 (2007). No
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estimate is given for Crawford or Clay. Ratcliffe repeats Forbes’s claim. DONALD RATCLIFFE, THE
ONE-PARTY PRESIDENTIAL CONTEST: ADAMS, JACKSON, AND 1824’S FIVE-HORSE RACE 233
(2015) [hereinafter RATCLIFFE 1824]; Donald Ratcliffe, Popular Preferences in the Presidential
Election of 1824, 34(1) J. EARLY REPUBLIC 45, 66 (2014).
Forbes’s argument is a model of how not to estimate the outcome of an electoral vote in a no-
fifths rule Union. “This figure is derived in the following manner. The total number of slaves in
the United States, according to the 1820 census figures, was 1,538,125. Three-fifths of this figure
gives a “federal number” of 911,400 for purposes of electoral representation.” FORBES, supra, at
334 n.34.
Here is the first problem. Multiply 1,538,125 by 3/5 and the result is 922,875. Divide
911,400 by 3/5 and the result is 1,519,000. This may be government work, but in the age of
spreadsheets, this is an easy calculation. Forbes continues, “The average size of a congressional
district in 1824 was approximately 41,000 persons; thus slaves accounted for approximately 22
additional congressional seats, and electoral votes.” Id.
The hidden assumption here is that Congress would have used the same ratio of representa-
tion in a no-fifths rule Union than it actually used in the three-fifths rule Union. The analysis
presented in this Article frames no such hypothesis, but considers a range of ratios instead. (By the
way, twenty-two additional seats result from a three-fifths rule contribution of 911,400. If the
three-fifths rule contribution is 922,875, the impact is closer to twenty-three seats rather than
twenty-two.) Forbes concludes:
Adams actually received 84 electoral votes; but by applying the same rule to him, his
total would have declined to 83 as a result of subtracting the slave representation (the
equivalent of 41,051 “federal votes”) from the 6 electoral votes he received from slave
states (3 from Maryland, 2 from Louisiana, and one from Delaware).
Id.
So, on this analysis, Adams loses a single electoral vote thanks to the three-fifths rule and
Jackson loses all the rest! (77 = 99 – 22. Twenty-two plus one equals twenty-three!) Forbes never
bothers to assess the impact on Crawford or Clay who won thirty-six and seventeen electoral votes
respectively in slave states. Forbes concludes his analysis by citing William Seward’s book on
John Quincy Adams and his source, Calvin Colton. Neither of these mid-nineteenth century com-
mentators make any claim about what the 1824 electoral vote would have been in a no-fifths rule
Union. They simply note that Jackson received fifty-five electoral votes from slave states com-
pared to only six for Adams. WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD, LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICES OF JOHN
QUINCY ADAMS: SIXTH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 150 (1856); CALVIN COLTON, 1 THE
LIFE AND TIMES OF HENRY CLAY 291 (1846).
Now consider the impact of the three-fifths rule on Adams’s electoral vote given Forbes’s
hidden assumptions. With only a single House seat, Delaware was immune to any change from a
no-fifths rule.
Maryland presents a tractable problem. Maryland chose its electors by district. With a slave
population of 107,398, it presumably loses two electoral votes leaving it with nine, matching
number of House members it actually had in the three-fifths rule Union since 1803. In 1802, the
Maryland legislature drew an eight-district, nine-representative map for its House delegation. Act
of Jan. 8, 1803, 1803 Md. Laws 36; The legislature reenacted this districting in 1806. Act of Jan.
25, 1806, 1806 Md. Laws 71. The data at A New Nation Votes for Maryland’s 1824 House elec-
tions confirms that it remained in place for the 1824 election. Spreadsheet on file with author.
With this districting in place, the county and town level data at A New Nation Votes reveals
Adams winning five of Maryland’s five electoral votes and Jackson four. Adams gains electoral
votes in a state that loses them thanks to a no-fifths rule! See A New Nation Votes, supra note 95,
at https://elections.lib.tufts.edu/catalog/tufts:md.presidentialelector1.1824 through https://elections
.lib.tufts.edu/catalog/tufts:md.presidentialelector9.1824 (use the “previous” and “next” options at
the top of the page to toggle between each district).This is yet another case of not being able to fill
in the blank in the following statement with a non-negative integer.
In state S, candidate C owed _____ electoral votes to the three-fifths rule.
Louisiana’s legislature chose its electors. With a slave population of 69,059, Louisiana would
have lost a single elector. There is no way to tell how its legislature would have chosen four
electors rather than five, However, one thing is certain: Having received only two electoral votes
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TABLE 40 PROJECTED ELECTORAL VOTE TOTALS FOR CLAY AND
CRAWFORD BASED ON NO-FIFTHS RULE APPORTIONMENTS,
1824
Ratio of  
Repr. 
Total  
Electoral  
Votes 
Clay  
Electoral 
Vote 
Crawford  
Electoral  
Vote 
Clay  
Margin  
Over  
Crawford 
New York 
Electoral  
Votes 
1:30,000 303 44 42 2 47 
1:31,000 292 43 41 2 45 
1:32,000 287 42 40 2 44 
1:33,000 282 41 39 2 43 
1:34,000 273 40 38 2 42 
1:35,000 263 39 37 2 40 
1:36,000 261 39 36 3 39 
1:37,000 255 37 36 1 38 
1:38,000 249 37 34 3 37 
1:39,000 242 36 32 4 36 
1:40,000 239 35 32 3 36 
1:41,000 233 34 31 3 35 
1:42,000 229 33 31 2 34 
1:43,000 223 33 30 3 33 
1:44,000 217 32 30 2 32 
1:45,000 216 31 30 1 32 
1:46,000 211 31 29 2 31 
1:47,000 209 31 29 2 30 
1:48,000 206 31 28 3 30 
1:49,000 198 29 28 1 29 
1:50,000 194 29 27 2 29 
Given the assumptions made above for the state-by-state electoral
vote, Clay finishes ahead of Crawford for all ratios of representation be-
tween 1:30,000 and 1:50,000.170 Clay’s margin over Crawford reflects the
in the actual election, Adams could not possibly have owed the three electoral votes to the three-
fifths rule necessary to give him a net loss of one!
Given the analysis of Maryland just presented, the best conjecture for Forbes’s hidden as-
sumptions is that Jackson wins 87 or 88 electoral votes, Adams 86 or 85, Crawford 31, and Clay
35. The uncertainty stems from whether Louisiana splits its four electoral votes evenly or three-to-
one for Jackson.
170. All ratios of representation between 1:30,000 and 1:50,000 have been examined. Craw-
ford never does better than falling one electoral vote short of Clay for third place with the assump-
tions made here. He does this for ratios of representation between 1:44,726 and 1:45,730 inclusive
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degree to which the assumptions made in the present analysis may be re-
laxed in favor of Crawford and against Clay.
B. The 1825 House Election
No apportionment based on a no-fifths rule results in a majority winner
in the Electoral College, just as no apportionment based on the three-fifths
rule results in a majority winner. Under all circumstances, the selection of
the president falls to the House.
1. The Actual House Election of 1825
A state-level analysis of the actual House election involving Crawford
will be useful before turning to an analysis of a hypothetical House election
involving Clay. This analysis classifies states into the following categories:
firmly for Jackson,
leaning to Jackson,
firmly for Adams,
leaning to Adams,
firmly for Crawford,
in play.
Alabama, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee voted decisively for
Jackson in the November election, giving him at least 63 percent of their
popular vote. Each voted for Jackson in the actual House election with only
Pennsylvania Federalist, Samuel Breck, not voting for Jackson (he voted for
Adams).171 These states are classified as firmly for Jackson.
Three states gave Jackson a less decisive victory in the popular vote.
Indiana gave him 47 percent of its vote compared to 34 percent for Clay.
New Jersey cast 52 percent of its ballots for Jackson and 43 percent for
Adams. In North Carolina, Jackson received 57 percent of the popular vote
compared to 43 percent for Crawford. The House delegations from Indiana
and New Jersey voted for Jackson by votes of 3–0 and 5–1 (Adams) respec-
tively. However, the delegation from North Carolina cast its vote for Craw-
ford with ten of its thirteen members voting for him, two voting for Adams,
and only one voting for Jackson. Indiana and New Jersey are classified as
leaning to Jackson.172 North Carolina is classified as in play by virtue of the
fact that its House delegation voted for Crawford rather than Jackson.
(Electoral College sizes of 216 to 213) and 1:48,621 and 1:49,248 inclusive (Electoral College
sizes of 203 to 198).
171. Neither the House Journal nor the Register of Debates records the details of the House
election. That was left to the press and was collected by Martis. See KENNETH C. MARTIS, THE
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 1789–1989, at
318–19 (1989).
172. On January 24, 1825, William Plumer Jr. wrote to his father that Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Indiana, Mississippi, and Alabama were certain to vote for Jackson. New
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John Quincy Adams received at least 70 percent of the vote in the five
New England states whose electorates chose their presidential electors.
(Vermont’s legislature chose its electors.) Rhode Island’s Samuel Eddy hes-
itated a long time before voting for Adams rather than Jackson,173 a vote
that would have left Rhode Island divided. Therefore, the present analysis
classifies Rhode Island as leaning to Adams. With one exception, the dele-
gations from the remaining four New England states voted unanimously for
Adams in the House election. Only Massachusetts’ Francis Baylies strayed
by voting for Jackson. These four states are classified as firmly for Adams.
Virginia gave nearly 56 percent of its popular vote to Crawford with
Adams receiving 22 percent, Jackson 19 percent, and Clay 3 percent.
Twenty of Virginia’s twenty-two Representatives voted for Crawford in the
House election with Adams and Jackson receiving one vote each. Virginia
is classified as firmly for Crawford.174
Clay won the popular vote by large margins in his home state of Ken-
tucky and in nearby Missouri. These states would prove to be crucial to
Adams’s victory in the House election. Missouri’s lone representative John
Scott cast his vote for Adams, in spite of the fact that the New Englander
had garnered less than 5 percent of the state’s popular vote.175 Eight of the
twelve members of the Kentucky House delegation defied the instructions
of the state legislature and cast their votes for Adams.176 These states are
classified as in play since their House delegations could not vote for Clay.
There were close popular votes in Ohio, Illinois, and Maryland. Clay
narrowly won the Buckeye state’s winner-take-all pot of sixteen electors
with 38.5 percent of its popular vote compared to 37 percent for Jackson
and 24.5 percent for Adams. Adams received the votes of ten Ohio mem-
bers in the House election with Jackson and Crawford each receiving two.
Illinois and Maryland each chose their electors by district. The Illinois
electorate split its statewide popular vote four ways, with Adams receiving
33 percent of the vote, Jackson 27 percent, Clay 22 percent, and Crawford
Jersey is notably absent from this list. See THE MISSOURI COMPROMISES, supra note 118, at 134.
A few days earlier, John Quincy Adams recorded Secretary of the Navy and former New Jersey
Senator Samuel Southard telling him that three of New Jersey’s representatives favored Adams. 6
ADAMS MEMOIRS, supra note 12, at 470–71. A month after the election, Stephen Van Rensselaer R
wrote to DeWitt Clinton that “New Jersey and Indiana would in a second or third ballot have gone
over to Adams.” William B. Fink, Stephen Van Rensselaer and the House Election of 1825, 32(3)
N.Y. HIST. 323, 329 (1951) (quoting Stephen Van Rensselaer to DeWitt Clinton, March 10, 1825.
DeWitt Clinton Papers).
173. MOONEY, supra note 126, at 296–99. R
174. Plumer Jr. wrote to his father that the Virginia delegation would vote for Crawford on the
first two or three ballots, and then for Adams. Letter from William Plumer Jr. to William Plumer
(Dec. 24, 1824), in THE MISSOURI COMPROMISES, supra note 118, at 124. Also, that it would never
vote for Jackson. Id. at 134.
175. For Scott, see Alan S. Weiner, John Scott, Thomas Hart Benton, David Barton and the
Presidential Election of 1824, 60 MO. HIST. REV. 460 (1966).
176. See Letter from William T. Barry to Clay (January 10, 1825), in 4 CLAY PAPERS, supra
note 117, at 11.
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18 percent. Daniel Cook, Illinois’ sole member of the House, voted for Ad-
ams in the House election. Adams and Jackson each captured 44 percent of
Maryland’s popular vote with Crawford and Clay receiving 10 percent and
2 percent respectively. However, Jackson won seven of the state’s eleven
electoral votes while Adams won only three and Crawford one. Adams nar-
rowly earned Maryland’s vote in the House election capturing the votes of
five of its nine members with Jackson getting three and Crawford one. All
three of these states are classified as in play by virtue of their close popular
votes.177
Six legislatures chose their state’s presidential electors. The legisla-
tures in South Carolina, Vermont, and Georgia selected electors who voted
unanimously for Jackson, Adams, and Crawford respectively. The House
delegations from these states voted in a similar unanimous fashion in the
House election. Therefore, these states are classified as being firmly for
Jackson, Adams, and Crawford respectively.
Delaware’s legislatively chosen electors cast two electoral votes for
Crawford and one for Adams. However, Louis McLane, the state’s sole
representative, was well known to be a friend of Crawford.178 For this rea-
son, Delaware is classified as firmly for Crawford. Clay’s accidents in Loui-
siana and New York have already been recounted.179 Adams barely won the
votes of these states in the House election. He received the votes of two of
Louisiana’s representatives with Jackson getting the third. New York’s vote
in the House election went to Adams at the last moment when Stephen Van
Rensselaer provided the crucial eighteenth vote180 to achieve an absolute
majority over Crawford, who received fourteen votes, and Jackson who re-
ceived two. Had Van Rensselaer cast his ballot for Crawford or Jackson, the
New York delegation would have been divided. Clearly, Louisiana and
New York were in play.
Table 41 summarizes the classifications just made.
177. On December 15, 1824, John Quincy Adams noted that “Cook has just come from Illi-
nois, and mentioned the result of the election of Presidential electors there. He says it leaves him
at perfect liberty to vote in the House as he should think best for the public interest.” 6 ADAMS
MEMOIRS, supra note 12, at 444. R
178. Letter from William Plumer Jr. to William Plumer Sr. (Dec. 25, 1824), in THE MISSOURI
COMPROMISES, supra note 118, at 125.
179. See supra Part III.A.1.
180. See Fink, supra note 172.
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TABLE 41 CLASSIFICATION OF STATES, ACTUAL HOUSE
ELECTION OF 1825
Category Count States 
Firmly for Jackson 5 Alabama, Mississippi, Pennsylvania,  South Carolina, Tennessee 
Leaning to Jackson 2 Indiana, New Jersey 
Firmly for Adams 5 Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts,  New Hampshire, Vermont 
Leaning to Adams 1 Rhode Island 
Firmly for Crawford 3 Delaware, Georgia, Virginia 
In Play 8 Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,  Missouri, New York, North Carolina, Ohio 
Of course, Henry Clay helped to deliver seven of the eight states in
play to John Quincy Adams on the first ballot, giving Adams the minimum
thirteen states needed to secure the presidency in the House election.
2. The 1825 House Election with Clay Instead of Crawford
Had Clay’s name rather than Crawford’s been before the House, then
certainly the states marked as firmly for Crawford would have been in play,
and the in play states that had unanimously given their electoral votes to
Clay would have been firmly for Clay.181 As a result, Table 42 represents
the likely starting point for a three-way contest among Adams, Jackson, and
Clay.
181. Ohio was initially classified as in play by virtue of its close popular vote. Representative
and future President James Buchanan, who voted for Jackson, explicitly noted that Clay controlled
the vote of the Ohio delegation in the three-way contest including Crawford. Letter from James
Buchanan to Thomas Elder (Jan. 2, 1825), in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES BUCHANAN: COMPRISING
HIS SPEECHES, STATE PAPERS, AND PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE 120 (John Bassett Moore ed.)
(1908) [hereinafter “WORKS OF JAMES BUCHANAN”].
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TABLE 42 CLASSIFICATION OF STATES, HYPOTHETICAL HOUSE
ELECTION OF 1825
Category Count States 
Firmly for Jackson 5 Alabama, Mississippi, Pennsylvania,  South Carolina, Tennessee 
Leaning to Jackson 2 Indiana, New Jersey 
Firmly for Adams 5 Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts,  New Hampshire, Vermont 
Leaning to Adams 1 Rhode Island 
Firmly for Clay 3 Kentucky, Missouri, Ohio 
In Play 8 
Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana,  
Maryland, New York, North Carolina,  
Virginia 
Shortly before he learned his ultimate fate in the actual three-fifths rule
Electoral College, Clay wrote to Francis Brooke, Chief Justice of the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals,182 that even if he nosed out Crawford for
third place, “I shall enter the H. so crippled that my election can scarcely be
anticipated.”183 Nevertheless, with the prize so near, Clay would likely not
have abandoned his quest in the no-fifths rule Union despite the accidents
he had suffered in New York and Louisiana. When Clay returned to the
House at the beginning of the Eighteenth Congress in 1823, he easily
wrested the Speaker’s chair from incumbent Philip Barbour with a first bal-
lot vote of 139–42.184 In contrast, two years earlier it took Barbour twelve
ballots to win the speakership in Clay’s absence.185
Of course, the present analysis can only entertain conjecture about how
the Eighteenth House would have voted for president had it been able to
vote for its Speaker, Henry Clay, rather than William Crawford, in a three-
way contest with Andrew Jackson and John Quincy Adams. With the insti-
tutional advantages of the Speaker’s chair, Clay might have been able to
win the House election. He surely could have forced it to go more than one
ballot.186
Certainly, Clay had a good chance of winning the four states that voted
for Crawford in the actual House election. New Hampshire representative
182. Brooke served on the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals from 1811 until his death in
1851. For Brooke, see 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF VIRGINIA BIOGRAPHY 62 (Lyon Gardiner Tyler ed.
1915); Brooke’s older brother Robert was of one of Henry Clay’s law teachers. DAVID S. HEIDLER
& JEANNE T. HEIDLER, HENRY CLAY: THE ESSENTIAL AMERICAN 23–24 (2010).
183. Letter from Clay to Brooke (Nov. 16, 1824), in 3 CLAY PAPERS, supra note 117, at 888.
For a similar remark made to Clay see Peter Porter’s letter of January 14, 1825. 4 Id. at 17.
184. 41 ANNALS OF CONG. 795 (1823).
185. 38 ANNALS OF CONG. 516 (1821).
186. For a much less optimistic view of Clay’s prospects, had his name rather than Crawford’s
been before the House, see RATCLIFFE 1824, supra note 169, at 229–58, especially 235–37.
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William Plumer Jr. wrote to his father that Virginia’s delegation would
never vote for Jackson nor would Delaware’s sole Representative Louis
McLane187—assertions corroborated in Adams’s Memoirs.188 Buchanan
wrote to Elder that neither North Carolina nor Georgia would vote for Ad-
ams,189 and North Carolina had indeed deserted Jackson for Crawford.
Buchanan also described Clay as having influence on Louisiana’s delega-
tion,190 which would have had only two members under a no-fifths rule
apportionment.191
Whether Clay could have won the votes of the larger delegations from
Maryland and New York is another matter.192 If Clay won Delaware, Geor-
gia, Louisiana, North Carolina, and Virginia, he would have been at least on
par with Adams and Jackson in the early ballots. With eight states in his
column, Clay might have been able to add Maryland and New York to his
list leaving him three states short of the thirteen required for election.
Rhode Island’s two-member delegation might have been ripe for Clay’s
persuasions. So might New Jersey’s delegation, which would have had be-
tween six and nine members under a no-fifths rule apportionment.193
Christopher Rankin, the only representative from Mississippi, might
have been the object of intense lobbying.194 It is even possible that Illinois’
lone member, Daniel Cook, who bore a grudge against Clay for the
speaker’s role in the House investigation of Cook’s father-in-law, Senator
Ninian Edwards, would have voted for his fellow westerner Clay.195
Three weeks before the House election, Daniel Webster wrote his
brother Ezekiel and asked, “Is it advisable, under any circumstances, to
hold out and leave the chair to Mr. Calhoun? Would or would not New
England prefer conferring the power on Calhoun, to a choice of General
187. See Letter from William Plumer Jr. to William Plumer (Dec. 25, 182) in THE MISSOURI
COMPROMISES, supra note 118, at 125–26; Letter from William Plumer Jr. to William Plumer
(Jan. 24, 1825), in THE MISSOURI COMPROMISES, supra note 118, at 134–36.
188. For Virginia, see Notes of a conversation with Virginia Senator James Barbour (January
13, 1825), in 6 ADAMS MEMOIRS, supra note 12, at 467. For Delaware, see Notes of a conversa- R
tion with Massachusetts representative Henry Dwight (February 2, 1825). Id. at 490.
189. WORKS OF JAMES BUCHANAN, supra note 181, at 121.
190. Id. at 120.
191. With a free population of 84,343, Louisiana would not receive a third House seat for any
ratio of representation above 1:28,114.
192. Willie Mangum described Clay as holding the votes of Maryland and New York in his
hands. Letter from Mangum to Duncan Cameron (Jan. 25, 1825), in THE PAPERS OF WILLIE PER-
SON MANGUM, supra note 121, at 174. However, this most likely concerned Clay’s ability to tip
the scale between candidates with nearly equal backing in each of these delegations.
193. With a census count of 270,018, New Jersey would have had nine representatives with a
ratio of representation as low as 1:30:000.
194. Rankin, who voted for Jackson, had meetings with Adams on December 15 and 29, 1824.
6 ADAMS MEMOIRS, supra note 12, at 442, 455. R
195. For the grudge, see MARY W. M. HARGREAVES, THE PRESIDENCY OF JOHN QUINCY AD-
AMS 39 (1985). Remini suggests that Cook might have been bribed to vote for Adams. REMINI,
CLAY, supra note 26, at 264 n.43.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\15-1\UST105.txt unknown Seq: 65  4-JAN-19 11:35
2018] THE THREE-FIFTHS RULE 223
Jackson?”196 Perhaps the Eighteenth House would have expired without
making a choice, thereby forcing newly elected Vice President John Cal-
houn to “act as president.”197 An unresolved stalemate in the Eighteenth
House would have left the presidential election to its successor, whose first
task would be to organize itself and choose a Speaker.
There are many scenarios in which John Quincy Adams would not
have been inaugurated on March 4, 1825.198 The nation might have had an
acting president. The Age of Jackson might have commenced four years
earlier. Henry Clay might have been elected after having received approxi-
mately 13 percent of the popular vote and just a handful of electoral votes
in the states whose legislatures chose their electors. Would this have been
the presidential game of faction envisioned by George Mason?199
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has been an essay in both actual history and virtual his-
tory.200 Each informs the other and each has its own challenges.
196. Letter from Daniel Webster to Ezekiel Webster (Jan. 18, 1825), in 2 THE PAPERS OF
DANIEL WEBSTER: CORRESPONDENCE 14 (1974). Webster was not the only one to realize that a
stalemate would make John Calhoun acting president. In his entry for December 22, 1824, John
Quincy Adams recorded a conversation with Virginia Senator James Barbour who “thought it
would be treason to the Constitution to hold out and prevent an election by the House until the 4th
of March, so as to give the actual Presidency to the Vice-President.” 6 ADAMS MEMOIRS, supra
note 12, at 450–51. Amos Kendall wrote to Clay that he “would sooner vote for any of the three R
than have a Viceregent for four years.” Letter from Amos Kendall to Henry Clay (Jan. 21, 1825),
in 4 CLAY PAPERS, supra note 117, at 35. R
197. “And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of
choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice-
President shall act as President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the
President.” U. S. CONST. amend. XII. (Superseded by U. S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3).
198. Jenkins and Sala analyzed the charge that Adams’s election by the Eighteenth House
resulted from the corrupt bargain of making Clay his secretary of state. They conclude that “Ad-
ams’s victory and profile of support were consistent with the sincere voting model and did not
support the corrupt-bargain hypothesis.” Jeffery A. Jenkins & Brian R. Sala, The Spatial Theory of
Voting and the Presidential Election of 1824, 42(4) AM. J. POL. SCI. 1157 (Oct. 1998). Professor
Jenkins has written to me that they did not analyze a three-way election involving Clay rather than
Crawford. He wrote “my hunch would be that there would not have been a first ballot winner.
Clay and Adams had very similar voting records, and thus had very similar NOMINATE scores,
so they would have split the Adams vote in the real-world House election. This would have helped
Jackson, as would Crawford not being in the race, but I doubt it would have been enough to get
Jackson a first ballot majority.” (Email correspondence on file with author.) Jenkins’ conjecture is
based exclusively on voting records in the Eighteenth House and does not consider the institu-
tional advantages Clay would have reaped as Speaker of the House.
199. At the Convention, Mason suggested that nineteen times out of twenty the Electoral Col-
lege would fail to produce a victor. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra
note 23, at 500. By the time of the Virginia ratifying convention, Mason raised the likelihood to R
forty-nine times out of fifty. 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 28, at 493.  For the phrase “the R
game of faction,” see RICHARD P. MCCORMICK, THE PRESIDENTIAL GAME 5 (1982).
200. Others might prefer the term “counterfactual history” to “virtual history.” The term “vir-
tual history” is taken from Niall Ferguson, Virtual History: Towards a ‘Chaotic’ Theory of the
Past, in VIRTUAL HISTORY: ALTERNATIVES AND COUNTERFACTUALS 1 (Niall Ferguson ed.) (1997).
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In the actual election of 1824, one of Henry Clay’s accidents occurred
when three New York electors defected away from him. Writing the actual
history of this episode, one commentator has written “It is futile to guess
what took place.”201 Another has written “Probably no one will ever know
exactly what happened.”202 Perhaps a hitherto undiscovered document will
surface that will enable a future generation of historians to resolve this
issue.
Writing virtual history has a different challenge: distinguishing plausi-
ble unrealized alternatives from implausible unrealized ones. Historian Ni-
all Ferguson has recognized this challenge and proposed a response.
How exactly are we to distinguish probable unreali[z]ed al-
ternatives from improbable ones? The most frequently raised ob-
jection to the counterfactual approach is that it depends on ‘facts
which concededly never existed’. Hence, we simply lack the
knowledge to answer counterfactual questions. But this is not so.
The answer to the question is in fact very simple: We should con-
sider as plausible or probable only those alternatives which we
can show on the basis of contemporary evidence that contempo-
raries actually considered.203
This is valuable advice for assessing claims made about the impact of the
three-fifths rule on the outcome of presidential elections.
This article rests on detailed historical knowledge in two areas. The
first is a detailed knowledge of the actual apportionment of the House of
Representatives at the Convention, by Congress in 1791–1792, and in 1822.
The second is the gold mine of data available at A New Nation Votes, a data
set that Gordon Wood has described as “monumental” and “[i]ndispensable
for understanding politics in the early Republic.”204
Freehling et al. may declare unproblematically that in the actual elec-
tion of 1800, Jefferson owed a dozen or so of his seventy-three electoral
votes to the three-fifths rule, compared to only two or so for Adams. That is
a matter of actual history based on the actual apportionment made by Con-
gress in 1791–1792205 and the choice of presidential electors made in 1800
under that apportionment.206
It is quite another matter, however, to assert that Jefferson owed his
election to the three-fifths rule. That is a matter informed by virtual history.
It is an assertion that Adams would have defeated Jefferson in 1800 in a no-
fifths rule Union, a matter of virtual history.
201. REMINI, VAN BUREN, supra note 123, at 82. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
202. MOONEY, supra note 126, at 294–95 n.63. See supra note 126 for the full passage.
203. Ferguson, supra note 200, at 86. (emphasis in original).
204. Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789–1815, at 745
(2009).
205. See supra Part II.B.1.
206. For the actual results, see 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 1024 (1801).
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Had the Constitutional Convention adopted a no-fifths rule, the elec-
tion of 1800 would not have been the first point of impact for that major
alteration in American history. If the Convention had adopted a no-fifths
rule, that decision would have impacted the apportionment of the House of
Representatives at the Convention itself in 1787 and by the Second Con-
gress in 1791–1792. That leaves two key unknowns: whether the minimal
ratio of representation in Article I, Section 2 would have been 30,000 or
something less, and what ratio would have been adopted by the Second
Congress. There is no way to determine with certainty what these ratios
would have been in a no-fifths rule Union.
However, it is possible to know with certainty what ratio of representa-
tion would not have been adopted by the Second Congress in 1792. It
would not have been 1:33,000 as supposed by Freehling et al. Congress
adopted that ratio because it minimized total remainders in a three-fifths
rule Union.207 For the very same reason, Congress would not have adopted
that ratio in a no-fifths rule Union.208 Nor would the House size have been
105 members in a no-fifths rule Union as Weston suggests.209 The Second
Congress treated total House size as an output, not an input. The Second
Congress never considered an apportionment method that began with a tar-
get House size.
The electoral votes from Maryland and North Carolina present similar
challenges for a virtual history of the 1800 election in a no-fifths rule
Union. In those cases in which the state legislature adopted a districting
plan for some number of electors or representatives in the early to middle
1790s, it is reasonable to suppose such a plan would have been in place for
the same number of presidential electors in the state in a no-fifths rule
Union.210 No such districting plan is available for North Carolina when it is
apportioned eleven or thirteen electors. In such cases, a viable alternative is
to consider a wide variety of districting plans generated by software based
on a reasonable set of specifications.211
Not surprisingly, this results in a set of probabilities. Jefferson wins the
election with some apportionments nationwide and in North Carolina. Ad-
ams wins with the rest. In virtual histories such as the one presented here
for the election of 1800, the most that can be said is that in a non-trivial
percentage of cases, one outcome follows; in another, non-trivial percentage
of cases, a different outcome follows.
207. See supra text accompanying Table 7 and Table 8.
208. See supra text accompanying Table 9 through Table 12.
209. See supra note 114. All apportionment methods considered began with a ratio of repre-
sentation that was a multiple of 1,000. A House size of 105 could only have been possible for a
ratio of between 28,437 and 28,507 inclusive.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 103, 104, and 106. R
211. See supra text accompanying notes 109 and 110. R
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\15-1\UST105.txt unknown Seq: 68  4-JAN-19 11:35
226 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:1
A virtual history of the election of 1824–1825 presents a different set
of challenges. Determining the outcome of the electoral vote in this election
does not critically depend on how the Congress resized the House in 1822.
Instead, it demands careful analysis of how the precise size of the House
impacts the number of electoral votes won by Henry Clay and William
Crawford in states that did not adopt the unit rule and chose electors who
voted for one or the other of them: Delaware, Maine, Maryland, and New
York.
Maine and Maryland chose electors by district in 1824. Projecting how
these states might have drawn a different number of districts in 1824 begins
with understanding the history of how they drew the actual districts.212
With that actual history in hand, it is possible to project a virtual history of
how they might have drawn a different number of districts in 1824, making
sure always to give Crawford any possible advantage over Clay in doubtful
cases.213 A similar rule advantaging Crawford over Clay applies when pro-
jecting how the Delaware and New York legislatures might have chosen an
alternate number of electors.214
Making sure that Clay never benefits at Crawford’s expense from any
choices made in this virtual history enables the conclusion that in a no-fifths
rule Union, Clay finishes in third place in the electoral vote, ahead of Craw-
ford. This can be known with certainty.
The outcome of a contingent House election of 1825 with the choice of
Henry Clay available is another matter. The late historian Robert Remini,
an authority on the era of Adams, Clay, and Jackson, adopted an air of
certainty when he wrote “In that case [Clay] would have been elected Presi-
dent—unquestionably.”215
This Article addresses a different issue than the one addressed by
Remini. He addressed the issue of whether Henry Clay would have been
chosen in the House contingent election if his name rather Crawford’s had
been in the mix. This Article asks whether a good case can be made that
John Quincy Adams owed his election to the three-fifths rule. The article
has demonstrated that in a no-fifths rule Union, Clay rather than Crawford
would have been the third candidate before the House.
With Speaker Henry Clay as one of three candidates for the presi-
dency, the dynamics of the House election would have been very different.
The lame duck Eighteenth House might still have elected John Quincy Ad-
ams president, but it might also have elected Henry Clay or Andrew Jack-
son instead. It might even have stalemated and been unable to make a
choice in the twenty-three days remaining in its session. Vice President
212. See supra text accompanying notes 136 through 143 and notes 151 through 166. R
213. See supra text accompanying Table 28 through Table 30 and Table 35 through Table 37.
214. See supra text accompanying note 133 and Table 38.
215. REMINI, CLAY, supra note 26, at 250.
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John Calhoun might have become acting president on March 4, 1825. A
plausible argument can be made that the House would not have elected
John Quincy Adams.
Actual history and virtual history inform each other.
